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ABSTRACT 
Over the past few years, wireless networks are becoming increasingly popular. The dominant 
question facing the wireless network today is: how can the network meet the needs of various 
users and applications? Two basic and primary needs for users are efficiency and security. To 
deal with these two concerns, this dissertation investigates the two areas and proposes four 
MAC-level approaches for security and performance enhancement in IEEE 802.11. 
In the first part, we propose three MAC-level approaches to improve the throughput per­
formance in wireless LANs, i.e., the Freeze Counter scheme (FC), the Dynamically Adaptive 
Retransmission (DAR), and the Quick Acknowledgement (QA) scheme. The Freeze Counter 
scheme is an adaptive error recovery mechanism in 802.11, which can perform different actions 
according to the reasons for frame losses. With the differentiation functionality, the non-collision 
error frames could be rapidly retransmitted without the binary exponential backoff procedure. 
Next, Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission scheme is an enhanced feedback scheme in 802.11, 
in which the CTS frames carry additional information concerning the previous data delivery 
without violating the 802.11 MAC layer semantics. Thirdly, we propose a Quick Acknowledge­
ment (QA) scheme as a replacement for positive acknowledgement in IEEE 802.11. QA is an 
adaptation of an ATM-based protocol, the Service Specific Connection Oriented Protocol (SS-
COP), for use as a link layer protocol in wireless LANs. By using similar concepts as selective 
ACK and negative ACK, the proposed protocol solves the inefficiency problem of positive ACK 
in 802.11, and therefore it performs better than 802.11 MAC. 
In the second part, we propose a lightweight statistical authentication protocol for wireless 
networks. With more and more applications on wireless networks, new concerns are raised when 
it comes to security issues. Authentication service particularly becomes one of the basic but nec­
essary security measures for wireless applications. However, traditional authentication protocols 
for wired networks do not work well in a wireless environment due to unique characteristics, such 
as error-prone wireless transmission medium, node mobility, and power conservation constraints 
of wireless devices. Tb meet this target, we propose a lightweight statistical authentication pro­
tocol for wireless networks, namely To solve the inherent out-of-sync problem with 
Shepherd protocol, we develop three synchronization schemes with their statistical methods. In 
Shepherd, the legitimacy of a mobile node is determined by continuously checking a series of 
random authentication bits where each bit in this stream is piggybacked by a packet. Such an 
authentication bit stream is generated by both mobile node and access point using the same 
random number generator under the same shared seed as a key. The complete evaluation and 
analysis of all proposed approaches have been discussed. We also show that the proposed ap­
proaches are practical for implementation in 802.11 to improve the security and performance of 
wireless LANs. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 IEEE 802.11 
Although the original concept of wireless LANs has existed since late 1970s , the WLAN 
technology started catching people's eyes in late 1990s. Today, it has become a ubiquitous 
networking technology. The recent explosive growth of this technology can be attributed to many 
factors, for example, technological advances in error correcting codes, modulation techniques, 
processing power on network interfaces, availability of unlicensed radio spectrum, and the need 
for wireless connectivity and mobility. 
In WLANs, the medium access control (MAC) protocol is the main element that manages 
congestion and error situations that may frequently occur in a lossy wireless link. In this 
dissertation, we focus on the efficiency of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol. 
1.2 Dissertation Overview 
In this dissertation, we propose approaches to achieve a secure and efficient wireless LAN. 
There are three approaches to enhance the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol and one for the wire­
less security, i.e. the Reeze Counter scheme (FC) , the Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission 
(DAR), the Quick Acknowledgement (QA) scheme, and the Shepherd protocol. 
In Chapter 2, we first give background knowledge of 802.11 MAC protocol. Then, we point 
out three problems causing the inefficiency in 802.11. Finally, we briefly present our solutions 
to these problems. 
In Chapter 3, we first introduce the redundant backoff (RB) problem existing in IEEE 802.11. 
The main reason is the error recovery mechanism in 802.11 deems all error cases as collisions 
and involves binary exponential backoff to avoid collisions. However, in case of errors due 
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to attenuation, fading, or interfering, binary exponential backoff will not help but cause extra 
frame delay. For the RB problem, we propose the Freeze Counter (FC) scheme, an adaptive error 
recovery mechanism, which can efficiently retransmit lost frames by effectively differentiating 
the collisions from other types of wireless errors. 
In Chapter 4, we propose a dynamic adaptive retransmission (DAR) scheme to deal with 
redundant retransmission (RR) problem. In IEEE 802.11, a positive acknowledgement informs 
sender of successful arrivals of data frames. However unacknowledged frames could result from 
either unsuccessful transmissions of data frames or positive ACK frame losses. The sender 
will simply retransmit any unacknowledged data frame, which is actually redundant in case of 
positive ACK frame losses. The idea of DAR is to clearly differentiate the reasons for frame 
loss by using modified CTS frames containing additional information on transmission status of 
unacknowledged frames. Based on that information, sender is able to dynamically determine 
whether to retransmit or not. 
In Chapter 5, we first explain why positive acknowledgement in IEEE 802.11 is inefficient. 
IEEE 802.11 provides fast recovery from frame losses using a rapid link level positive acknowledg­
ment scheme. However, the adoption of positive acknowledgment causes frequent ACK timeout 
at high bit-error rate and leads to inefficient frame transmission. To improve efficiency of the 
acknowledgments mechanism in IEEE 802.11, we propose a novel link layer protocol for wireless 
LANs. The proposed protocol is an adaptation of an ATM-based protocol, the Service Specific 
Connection Oriented Protocol (SSCOP), for use as a link layer protocol in wireless LANs. The 
protocol uses much less bandwidth on the return path and hence enhances the performance of 
data frame transmission. 
In the wireless security part , we propose a lightweight authentication protocol in Chapter 6. 
With the increasing performance and dropping price of wireless networking equipment, wireless 
networking has revolutionized the way people work and play. Wi-Fi hot spots popping up all 
over the country provide a convenient means of internet connectivity. For the ISPs of hot spots, 
authentication and accounting have been recognized as two most crucial concerns. For authen­
tication, IETF PANA^ WG, is working on a transport protocol for authenticating IP hosts for 
^PANA stands for Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access 
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network access. However, PANA does not provide access control and per-packet authentication, 
which are desirable In accounting and access control. Instead of using high-overhead crypto-
based mechanisms, such as IPSec or 802.111, we propose a lightweight statistical authentication 
protocol, namely Our analytical results show that Shepherd performs well in terms 
of computational and communication cost, synchronization efficiency, and protocol operation 
secrecy. Finally, we conclude this proposal in Section 7. 
*The access point (AP) in a wireless network authenticates the mobile nodes as a Shepherd discriminates 
among similar sheep according to their characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND WORK AND THE PROBLEM 
2.1 MAC Protocol in IEEE 802.11 
IEEE 802.11b is a standard for Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) 
specifications for wireless LANs, promoted by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi­
neers. With the increasing importance of Wireless technologies in the LAN environment and the 
IEEE 802.11 is the most mature technology to date. In this section, we will only describe some 
components in the 802.11 MAC protocol, which will be used in latter chapters. The details of 
802.11 MAC can be found in [38] [74]. 
2.1.1 MAC Frame Format in IEEE 802.11 
Three types of frames are defined in the TREE 802.11 standard [38]. They are management 
frame, control frame, and data frame. The general format of an 802.11 MAC frame is represented 
in Fig.2.1. The type and subtype values in the frame control field of a frame determine the type 
of the frame. There are some reserved values in the field, not defined in the current standard. 
2.2 Target Problems in 802.11 MAC 
2.2.1 Redundant Backoff Problem 
Previous works found that the 802.11 standard protocol performs inefficiently, and that an 
appropriate modification on error recovery mechanism can help the IEEE 802.11 protocol achieve 
to its optimal behavior. One potential Saw in the 802.11 error recovery mechanism is that 802.11 
deems all error cases as collisions and involves binary exponential backoff to avoid collisions. In 
reality, there are many reasons leading to high error rate over wireless links, such as attenuation, 
fading, interfering active radiation sources, or collision with another transmission. Nevertheless, 
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Figure 2.1 802.11 MAC frame format and control field 
it is difficult for a station to know the real reason for frame losses, and to differentiate wireless 
errors in the 802.11 MAC layer because no cross-layer mechanism or information exchange 
between PHY and MAC layer. Accordingly, at most, a station can estimate the knowledge 
and use it to perform the tuning. Obviously, the more accurately a station can estimate the 
knowledge, the more efficiently a station can perform the tuning. It appears that effectively 
differentiating wireless errors can reduce the times of redundant backoff, and therefore help to 
improve the performance in 802.11. 
We look at a simple example to explain this problem. Let only two mobile hosts exist in a 
wireless network and one sends data Sow to the other through a lossy wireless link. In other 
words, not all errors that occur are due to collisions. Unfortunately, whenever a error occurs, 
the sender will recover the error by binary exponential backoff, that is, to double the contention 
window (CW), because all errors are deemed as collisions in 802.11. Obviously, unnecessarily 
increasing the CW to avoid collisions degrades throughput performance. If the sender can be 
aware that the errors are due to other reasons, such as fading or interference, other error recovery 
mechanisms, such as keeping CW unchanged or faster retransmission, are appropriate. 
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2.2.2 Redundant Retransmission Problem 
Unlike the Ethernet IEEE 802.3 Standard, which uses CSMA/CD to manipulate link layer 
frames, the IEEE 802.11 standard uses CSMA/CA to avoid transmission collision, and uses 
positive acknowledgement to inform the sender of successful delivery of data frames. To address 
the hidden node problem in wireless networks, the IEEE 802.11 standard has two special control 
frames, Request To Send (RTS) and Clear To Send (CTS) frames. When the sender fails to 
receive the ACK frame from the receiver upon expiration of the timer, which is deemed an 
unsuccessful delivery in the current 802.11 standard, the sender simply retransmits the data 
frame. But limitations exist. Though the positive ACK scheme is helpful in confirming the 
successful delivery of data frames, it may invoke unnecessary retransmissions. Particularly, 
in case of the ACK frame loss after a successful data frame delivery, the sender is unable to 
differentiate it from unsuccessful data delivery and will simply invoke the retransmission scheme. 
Thus the receiver will get redundant retransmitted frames, which compromises the transmission 
efficiency. Hence, the goal of our proposed scheme is to improve the efficiency of link layer 
retransmission by avoiding this redundancy. 
Currently, two types of retransmission are applied for recovery of lost packets in lossy net­
works. Retransmission mechanisms exist in both the TCP layer and the link layer. TCP 
retransmission is a part of TCP congestion control mechanisms. When three duplicate ACKs 
are received (Fast Retransmit), or timeout occurs (Slow Start), the sender retransmits the corre­
sponding TCP packet. On the other hand, when the link layer timer to receive an ACK^ expires, 
a link layer retransmission will be triggered. Compared with TCP retransmission, link layer re­
transmission adapts quickly to link characteristics due to shorter timeout periods. Moreover, 
since the length of a frame is much shorter than that of a TCP packet, retransmission in the 
link layer costs less than that in TCP. In the last five years many researchers have been focusing 
on improving TCP retransmissions to solve wireless TCP problems [10] [61] [60]. Balakrishnan 
(1995) proposed the snoop TCP scheme, a TCP-aware link layer protocol using link layer re­
transmission from a base station [11]. Extensions of Link Layer retransmission are also used 
^This ACK is an acknowledgement frame in link layer. 
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in research on QoS over wireless LANs [25]. To optimize the retransmission scheme in the link 
layer to achieve high transmission efficiency in higher layers is an important issue. However, no 
research has been done on link layer retransmission to improve the efficiency of the basic frame 
exchange protocol. In Chapter 3, we proposed an enhanced link layer retransmission scheme 
based on the 802.11 standard to make transmission more effective. 
2.2.3 Inefficient Acknowledgement Problem 
Due to the high loss rate experienced over wireless links as well as the presence of hidden 
terminals, the IEEE 802.11 standard uses a positive acknowledgement scheme. In the IEEE 
802.11 protocol [38], the reception of data frames requires the receiving host to respond with an 
acknowledgment, generally an ACK frame, if the received frame is correct. Lack of reception of 
an expected ACK frame indicates to the source host that an error has occurred. This technique 
is known as positive acknowledgment. The main advantage of positive acknowledgement is high 
reliability since the sender can quickly detect the occurrence of any transmission error. 
Fig.2.2 shows an example of positive acknowledgement. The receiver returns an acknowl­
edgment frame, ACK, to the transmitter; immediately upon the successful completion of data 
reception. When the data frame is lost, the transmitter waits for the ACK frame for a period of 
ACK.Timeout, and then retransmits the lost data frame. Although the positive acknowledgment 
scheme is reliable and simple, it leads to inefficient frame transmission. Since each data frame 
requires one ACK, the large traffic overhead of ACK transmission wastes the scarce bandwidth 
of wireless networks. However, at a low error rate, most of the frame transmissions are correct 
and the positive acknowledgment scheme is inefficient. In this case, if the negative acknowledge­
ment scheme is used, the receiver only requests the retransmission of the lost frames. Thus, 
the amount of ACK traffic can be reduced significantly. To solve the inefficiency problem of 
positive acknowledgement, this section proposes an idea of an adaptation of the Service Specific 
Connection Oriented Protocol (SSCOP), for use as a link layer protocol in wireless LANs. 
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Figure 2.2 Positive acknowledgement scheme 
2.3 Proposed Solutions 
2.3.1 FC: Freeze Counter Scheme 
There are many reasons leading to high error rate over wireless links, such as attenuation, 
fading, interfering active radiation sources, or collision with another transmission. Unfortu­
nately, the error recovery mechanism in 802.11 deems all error cases as collisions and involves 
binary exponential backoff to avoid collisions. However, in the case of errors due to attenuation, 
fading, or interfering, binary exponential backoff cannot help but cause extra frame delay. 
We propose a Freeze Counter (FC) scheme, an adaptive error recovery mechanism, to ef­
ficiently retransmit lost frames by differentiating the collisions from other types of wireless 
errors[90]. The performance of the IEEE 802.11 protocol, with and without the FC mechanism, 
is investigated through simulation. Simulation results show that differentiating wireless errors 
can be used to prevent unnecessary delay and improve throughput performance. It also indicates 
that our mechanism is very effective, robust, and has traffic differentiation potentialities. 
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2.3.2 DAR: Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission 
In the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard, a positive acknowledgement informs the sender of 
successful arrivals of data frames. However unacknowledged frames could result from either 
unsuccessful delivery of data frames or positive ACK frame losses. Therefore the sender simply 
retransmits the unacknowledged data frame, which may cause redundant retransmission in case 
of positive ACK frame losses. In Chapter 4, we propose an enhanced retransmission scheme 
that we call Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission (DAR), which uses modified RTS and CTS 
frames containing additional information on transmission status of unacknowledged frames[92]. 
Based on that information, the sender is able to dynamically determine whether to retransmit or 
not. Experiments and analysis show that our proposed scheme efficiently decreases redundant 
retransmission by clearly differentiating the reasons for frame loss. 
2.3.3 QA: Quick Acknowledgement Scheme 
The IEEE 802.11 standard provides fast recovery from frame losses using a rapid link level 
positive acknowledgment scheme. However, the adoption of positive acknowledgment leads to 
inefficient frame transmission. Therefore we propose a novel link layer protocol for wireless 
LANs[94]. The proposed protocol is an adaptation of an ATM-based protocol, the Service 
Specific Connection Oriented Protocol (SSCOP), for use as a link layer protocol in wireless 
LANs. We evaluate and compare the performance of the protocol with IEEE 802.11. The 
results show that the proposed protocol has a much better performance in an error-prone wireless 
environment, even when the bit error rate is severely degraded. 
2.3.4 Shepherd 
Since traditional authentication protocols for wired networks do not work well in a wireless 
environment, in Chapter 6, we propose a lightweight statistical authentication protocol, namely 
j%ephenf[95]. In Shepherd, the legitimacy of a mobile node is determined by continuously 
checking a series of random authentication bits where each bit in this stream is piggybacked by 
a packet. Such an authentication bit stream is generated by both mobile node and access point 
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using the same random number generator under the same shared seed as a key. We analyze this 
protocol under three synchronization schemes. Our analytical results show that this protocol 
performs well in terms of computational and communication cost, synchronization efficiency, and 
protocol operation secrecy. We also show that this new protocol is practical for implementation 
in wireless LANs. 
11 
CHAPTER 3. FC: FREEZE COUNTER SCHEME 
3.1 Introduction 
The explosive growth in the number of mobile device users and Internet services has been 
accompanied by the increasing number of wireless technologies. Wireless transmissions are 
subject to interference from outside sources, absorption, scattering, fading, and interference. 
This can result in very high error rates. Moreover, since conditions change over time (due to 
mobility or intermittent interference source), the error environment will also change. Such a 
variable, high error environment can bring problems for Medium Access Control (MAC)-layer 
protocols and higher-layer applications [34]. 
One big obstacle to compromise the good performance is non-negligible bit-error rates 
(BER)[55]. To make matters worse, error rates can be highly variable due to changes in the wire­
less environments. The networking community has explored a broad spectrum of solutions to 
deal with wireless error environments. They range from link layer solutions [34] [24] to transport 
protocol [55] [10]. 
Previous work have showed that the standard protocol can be very inefficient and that an 
appropriate tuning of its backoff algorithm can make the IEEE 802.11 protocol close to its 
optimal behavior. To perform this tuning, a station must have exact knowledge of the network 
contention level, such as the reasons for frame losses or the number of active nodes in the network. 
Unfortunately, this information is not obtainable because there is no cross-layer mechanism or 
information exchange between PHY and MAC layer. Accordingly, at most, a station can estimate 
the knowledge and use it to perform the tuning. Obviously, the more accurately a station can 
estimate the knowledge, the more efficiently a station can perform the tuning. We present a 
distributed estimation mechanism, called Freeze Counter (FC) scheme, for contention control 
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in IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs. The scheme measures the network contention level by using 
a simple estimate, the Freeze Counter, which can be easily obtained by exploiting information 
that is already available in the standard protocol. The PC scheme is an adaptive error recovery 
mechanism. That is, based on the estimated knowledge accuracy, PC can efficiently retransmit 
lost frames by differentiating the collisions from other types of wireless errors. Since our scheme 
extends from the DCF of 802.11, we will sketch CSMA/CA in the next section, and then go into 
the proposed scheme. 
3.2 CSMA/CA 
The CSMA/CA is a contention-based multiple access technology that requires each station 
to sense the medium to be idle for a period of time before sending each frame. The period of 
time is called inter-frame space (IFS) whose length is related to the frame priority. The level 
of frame priorities are classified as Short IFS (SIFS), PCF IFS (PIPS), DCF IPS (DIPS) and 
Extended IPS (EIFS), which correspond to, for example, ACK frames, PCF control frames, 
data frames, and retransmission frames, respectively. More details about the frame priority can 
be referred to [38]. In 802.11, the backoff procedure is used for collision avoidance, where each 
station waits for a backoff time (a random time interval) before its frame transmission. 
3.3 Freeze Counter Scheme 
In this section we first introduce the idea of differentiating between collision and other types 
of errors over WLANs, and then discuss the design of the proposed solution, the Freeze Counter 
(PC) scheme. 
3.3.1 Main Idea 
The main idea of the PC scheme is to use wireless traffic information collected by a mobile 
host in the backoff procedure to effectively differentiate wireless errors. Before sending each 
frame, a mobile host waits for the IPS and a backoff time. The station will decrease its backoff 
time counter by one if the medium is sensed idle for a slot-time and freeze the backoff time 
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counter when the medium is busy. In other words, many freezes may happen in a backoff 
procedure. At a higher traffic load, the occurrences of freezes can be observed more frequently. 
When the backoff time is decreased to zero, the station transmits its frame immediately. If 
another host sends at the same time, a collision occurs. At a higher traffic load, the probability 
of collision is higher [67]. Hence conclusively the freeze counter (FC) could act as an indicator 
of probability of collisions. 
3.3.2 Freeze Counter 
Current 802.11 cannot differentiate collisions from various types of wireless errors and uses 
binary exponential backoff for all error types, which unnecessarily increases CW. Our scheme 
differentiates wireless errors according to the frame's freeze counter, which is calculated by the 
mobile host in the backoff procedure before sending each frame. Whenever an error occurs, 
the freeze counter is used to estimate probability of collision and to help differentiate wireless 
errors. Specifically, when FC is larger than FCTTineaMda, the error is estimated to be due to a 
collision, and binary exponential backoff is triggered. Otherwise, most likely the error is due to 
a fading or interference and the sender keeps CW constant. The procedure of the FC scheme is 
presented in Fig.3.1 
3.3.3 An Example of the FC Scheme 
An example of multiple mobile hoists is given to illustrate the calculated FC value in the 
backoff procedure. As shown in Fig.3.2, the backoff timer of station B freezes three times due 
to the transmission of station C, D, and E in B's backoff procedure. Thus, the freeze counter of 
the station B is 3. The values of FC of station A to E are (0,3,0,1,1). 
3.4 Experiment and Analysis 
3.4.1 Simulation Environment and Parameters 
We used Network Simulator (NS-2) [48] to simulate a wireless network that consists of multi­
ple sender-receiver pairs connected over a lossy link with bandwidth 10Mbps. Five experiments 
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Figure 3.2 An example of 5 stations using the FC scheme 
were performed to measure the performance of data transfer over wireless link with the FC 
scheme and the IEEE 802.11 standard. The FC scheme had been implemented using C++ in 
the NS-2 package. Specifically, mac-802_ll.cc and mac-802_ll.h , the two files involved in the 
802.11 package in NS-2, were altered to favor the binary exponential backoff mechanism, and 
the operations of freeze counter were introduced. 
In order to measure the performance of the protocols under controlled conditions, we gener­
ated errors on the lossy link using a two-state error model, including both error-free and error 
states[68]. In particular, each state has a random variable determining the length of each state. 
We investigated the performance of these protocols across a range of frame loss rates from 0.1% 
to 10%. At a high error rate, there were several occasions when multiple frames were lost in 
close succession or when both data and the first retransmission data frame were lost. 
All the other parameters in the simulation models, listed in the Table 3.1, are referenced 
from [67]. 
3.5 Enhancements to the IEEE 802.11 Standard 
3.5.1 Throughput Performance 
In experiment 1, we examined the flaws of the current 802.11 standard with a special eval­
uation case. In this case, only two mobile nodes existed in the wireless network and one node 
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Table 3.1 Parameters used throughout all simulations parameter value 
31 
C" Wmaz 1023 
Frame loss rate variable: 0 to 0.1 
Frame size 512 Bytes 
SIPS 10/43 
DIPS 90/48 
Slot time 20/43 
Number of mobile nodes variable: 6 or 20 
Number of Bows variable: 3 or 10 
Flow rate 800kbps or 1200kbps 
Medium capacity lOMbpse 
FCZT&resAoMs variable: 3,6,9 
RTS Threshold 300 
sent one UDP flow with CBR^ equal to 1200kbs to the other. Thus, no collision would occur 
in this scenario. The results of simulations are presented in Fig.3.3, showing the PC scheme 
achieved better throughput performance than 802.11. The reason of the improvement was that 
CW was fixed at whenever errors occurred. Accordingly, at a higher frame error rate, 
the improvement was even more significant, as shown in Fig.3.3. Because more error frames 
were misinterpreted by 802.11 as collisions and they were handled correctly in the FC scheme. 
In experiment 2, a common case was used and the traffic pattern was closer to real network 
behavior. In this experiment, 6 mobile nodes existed in the wireless network. 3 mobile hosts sent 
3 UDP Sows at CBR equal to 800kbs to the other 3. In Fig.3.4, the PC scheme still has better 
throughput performance than 802.11 with increasing error rate. Fig.3.5 shows the improvement 
of the PC scheme increases as the error rate rase. For example, when the frame error rate is 
5%, the improvement is about 2.5%. 
In experiment 3, we chose a larger number of mobile hosts than that in experiment 2 and 
results were compared. Similarly, the FC scheme had better throughput performance than 
802.11 with increasing error rate, as shown in Fig.3.6. Fig.3.7 shows that the improvement of 
^CBR stands for constant bit rate. 
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Figure 3.3 Throughput versus frame error rate for 2 stations 
the FC scheme increases as error rate increased. For example, at a frame error rate of 5%, the 
improvement is about 2.3%. 
These results suggested that the FC scheme always had a better throughput performance 
than 802.11, regardless of the number of mobile nodes existed. Furthermore, the improvement 
of the FC scheme was even higher at higher error rates because of the increased ability of the 
FC scheme to differentiate non-collision wireless errors. 
In experiment 4, we explored the effect on different FCTTwiea/ioM values. We tested 3, 6, and 
9 as FCTTireakokkin the environment of experiment 2. In Fig.3.8, the differences between three 
cases were indistinct, that is, the influence of FCT/ineaAoMs value was trivial in an environment 
of a small number of mobile nodes. 
In experiment 5, a larger number of mobile hosts than that in experiment 4 was chosen 
and results were compared. In Fig.3.9, when the error rate was lower than 2%, the differences 
between the three cases were very small. When the error rate was larger than 2%, the curve of 
-FCT/ireaWd = 9 dropped faster indicating a lower throughput performance than the other 2 
cases. When the error rate was larger than 5%, the curve of f CTkreaAoW = 6 dropped even 
faster indicating a much lower throughput than the case of fCT&resAoM = 3. In summary, at 
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Figure 3.4 Throughput versus frame error rate for 6 stations 
a low error rate, the differences between the three cases were small. While at a high error rate, 
the smallest FCTTinea&oMs had best throughput performance. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we proposed an adaptive error recovery mechanism, which can perform 
different actions according to the reasons for frame losses. With the differentiation function, the 
non-collision error frames could be rapidly retransmitted without the binary exponential backoff 
procedure in the current IEEE 802.11 MAC. The simulation results showed that the FC scheme 
could achieve a stable performance, regardless of the trafhc load. In the future, the concepts of 
differentiation of wireless errors may be applied to improve the Quality of service (QoS) over 
wireless LAN. 
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CHAPTER 4. DAR: DYNAMICALLY ADAPTIVE RETRANSMISSION 
4.1 Introduction 
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) are gaining wider and wider popularity in various 
ûelds. As a standard for WLAN, 802.11 was initiated by IEEE in 1997 to provide simple and 
robust features for wireless connection [38]. 
In 802.11, when the sender fails to receive the ACK frame from the receiver upon expiration 
of the timer, which is deemed an unsuccessful delivery in the current 802.11 standard, the sender 
simply retransmits the data frame. But limitations exist. Though the positive ACK scheme is 
helpful in confirming the successful delivery of data frames, in case of the ACK frame loss 
after a successful data frame delivery the sender is unable to differentiate it from unsuccessful 
data delivery and will simply invoke the retransmission scheme. Thus the receiver will get 
redundant retransmitted frames, which degrades the transmission efficiency. Hence, the goal of 
our proposed scheme is to improve the efficiency of link layer retransmission by avoiding this 
redundancy. 
4.2 Newly Defined Frame Format in IEEE 802.11 
Three types of frames are defined in the IEEE 802.11 standard [38], i.e. management frame, 
control frame, and data frame. The general format of an 802.11 MAC frame is represented in 
Fig.2.1, in which the type and subtype values in the frame control field of a frame determine 
the type of the frame. There are some reserved values in the field, not defined in the current 
standard. We have defined four new frames using some of the reserved subtype values (shown in 
Table 4.1). Their functions will be explained in the following section. Other fields in the above 
frames will be filled according to the current IEEE 802.11 standard. 
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Table 4.1 New frame types and subtypes 
Frame Type Subtype 
Data(Authentication bit=0) 10 1000 
Data(Authentication bit=l) 10 1001 
01 0001 
01 0010 
failure / success: 
ACK Frame 
P = ProùaMRy of AameWure, : ^ End of a successfulLAame exchange 
Figure 4.1 Scenarios of two-way frame exchange protocol 
To facilitate understanding of our scheme, we use a simple model to demonstrate scenarios 
for each enhancement. As shown in Fig.4.1, each node represents a transmission state and each 
directed edge represents a state transition. A value is assigned to show the probability of the 
transition. The initial state is at the top in Fig.4.1. If the directed edge goes southeast, it stands 
for a successful frame delivery. If the directed edge goes southwest, it indicates a frame delivery 
failure. 
Before we introduce our enhanced scheme, the conventional two-way frame exchange protocol 
is studied as follows (Fig.4.1). To simplify our analysis, we suppose the probability of frame 
errors is a fixed value P, regardless of the frame type. Let F(e) be the probability of an event 
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e. We have the following: 
_F(,StiCce3s/W /rame ezc/ianpe) 
= f (Swcc. data deZi^er^) x f (Succ. ACK (feKuer;/) 
= (l-P)(l-f) 
The probability of a successful frame exchange in the 802.11 standard is represented as line 
2 in Fig.4.2 where the X axis is probability of frame loss and the Y axis is the probability of 
a successful frame exchange. Line 1 in Fig.4.2 is an ideal target which means the probability 
of a successful frame exchange = 1 - (the probability of the frame loss). And our objective in 
proposing an enhanced scheme is to fad a curve closely approaching line 1 between the two 
lines, represented as line 3 in Fig.4.2. In this section, two basic enhancements are introduced, 
the improved two-way and four-way frame exchange protocols. Then the proposed DAB, scheme, 
which is derived from those two enhancements, is described in detail. 
4.2.1 Improved Two-Way Frame Exchange Protocol 
The two-way frame exchange protocol in IEEE 802.11 includes a pair consisting of a data 
frame from the sender to the receiver and a corresponding positive ACK frame from the receiver 
to the sender confirming a successful data frame delivery. Lack of reception of an expected 
ACK frame indicates to the sender that an error has occurred in the frame exchange. However, 
the receiver may have received the data frame correctly, and the error may have occurred in 
the reception of the ACK frame. To the initiator of the frame exchange, this condition is 
indistinguishable from that in which an error occurs in the initial frame. The sender may then 
simply retransmit the previous frame, which is redundant to the receiver. 
In order to improve the conventional two-way frame exchange protocol, the sender needs 
additional information to determine whether a retransmission is necessary. The protocol for 
both the sender and the receiver are illustrated in Fig.4.3 and Fig.4.4 as modifications to the 
current IEEE 802.11 standard. 
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Figure 4.4 Improved two-way frame exchange protocol at the receiver 
27 
iy \14-P: ; Data Frame 
! . .  
; i l _ i 
I X-1 Tnggering data frame_ I 
U ' ' 
1 
k| Special ACK Frame . 
ACK Frame 
R? ProbabiKty frame failure. @ End a successful &ame exchange 
Figure 4.5 Scenarios of the improved two-way frame exchange protocol 
After the sender sends a data frame, call it frame JV, it buffers the frame in case it does not 
receive the corresponding ACK frame. The sender then sends the next data frame with subtype 
= 1000, called a triggering data frame, which triggers an inquiry from the sender to the receiver. 
The receiver will respond to the triggering data frame with a special ACK frame whose subtype 
is 0000 when the previous data has been successfully received. Otherwise a regular ACK frame 
will be sent back to the sender so that the sender is able to determine the previous data frame 
was lost and retransmission is necessary. It is obvious as shown in Fig.4.5 that the probability 
of a successful frame exchange improves as follows: 
4.2.2 Improved Four-Way Frame Exchange Protocol 
The four-way frame exchange protocol aims at eliminating the hidden node problem by 
claiming the occupancy of wireless mediums before real transmission. Two types of small control 
F(^ucceas/W/romeea;cAa7ige) = (1 — + (1 — f (1 — 
= (1 - P)2 4- f(l - P)3 > (1 - _P)2 
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Figure 4.6 Scenarios of the improved four-way frame exchange protocol 
frames RTS and CTS are exchanged between the sender and the receiver so that other parties 
in the wireless neighboring regions hearing the two frames can hold their trafEc for a period of 
time to avoid collision. 
Much like the improved two-way frame exchange protocol, the improved four-way protocol 
uses a special ACK frame to piggyback the transmit information to the sender after a triggering 
data frame. Fig.4.6 shows the scenarios of the improved four-way frame exchange protocol with 
RTS and CTS frames. 
4.3 Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission (DAR) Scheme 
DAR is proposed based on the above two improvements. We are not using the specially 
defined data frame as in the improved two-way frame exchange protocol, but a specially defined 
RTS instead with subtype set to 0001, called a triggering RTS, to inquire to the receiver if the 
previous data frame has successfully arrived. Therefore the special RTS/CTS frame exchange 
is triggered dynamically when the corresponding ACK is not received. In other words, we 
use the existing RTS/CTS frame exchange to piggyback the transmission information to the 
sender. In addition, the sender does not have to buffer frames in this scheme because it will 
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Figure 4.7 DAR scheme at the sender 
be capable of determining which frame to send before transmission. The sender procedure can 
then be simplified as shown in Fig.4.7. The frame exchange initiator sends a special RTS 
frame whose subtype is 0001 if it is unable to receive a positive ACK frame before the timeout. 
Retransmission is not invoked immediately at this time. Upon receipt of a regular CTS frame, 
the sender knows that the previous data frame did not arrive at the receiver. Retransmission 
becomes necessary in this case. Otherwise, the sender just ignores the case of a lost ACK frame 
if it receives a special CTS frame whose subtype is 0010. If the last data frame is followed by an 
ACK loss, the sender will still initiate a triggering RTS inquiring whether the last data frame 
has been successfully delivered. In this RTS frame the duration field will be filed in accordance 
with the expected special CTS only. Fig.4.8 illustrates the DAR scheme at the receiver. 
Note that the 802.11 MAC layer semantics are not violated in DAR because the frame exchange 
process is not intercepted and the frame exchange sequence remains the same, which means it 
is still atomic. Fig.4.9 show the scenarios of DAR. 
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4.4 Theoretical Analysis 
4.4.1 Analysis of the Improved Two-Way Frame Exchange Protocol 
The key point of our improved two-way frame exchange protocol is two specially defined 
types of frames containing additional feedback information. Fig.4.10 shows the performance 
improvement (represented as the probability of successful frame exchange on the Y axis) with 
respect to bit error rate (represented as BER on the X axis) Obviously the probability of suc­
cessful frame exchange in the enhanced scheme is higher than that in the current TREF. 802.11 
standard. Performance will be improved as a result. A key concept in the analysis is the differen­
tiation ratio, defined to measure the performance of DAR. We define the differentiation ratio as 
the ratio of successfully delivered frames with lost ACKs that can be differentiated by the sender 
using the enhanced scheme over all failed frames detected by the conventional retransmission 
scheme. It is obvious that the differentiation ratio in the conventional two-way frame exchange 
protocol is always 0. Let p represent BER, and Zen«f and fen* represent the lengths of the data 
and ACK frames. We calculate the differentiation ratio D*//., in the improved two-way frame 
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Figure 4.9 Scenarios of the DAB, scheme 
exchange protocol as follows: 
^ number o/ aucceaa/WZy delivered dato /romea tuif A Zoaf AC AT 
number o/ /aiZed /romea 
_ [(1 - p) * Zenj] * [p * fenq] * [(1 - p) * fenj * [(1 - p) * Zen«] 
[(1 - p) * fe»j] * [p * Zeno] 
- [(1 -p) * fend] * [(1 - p) * (g"..] 
Fig.4.11 shows the differentiation ratio in the improved two-way frame exchange protocol 
with respect to BER. When the bit error rate is relatively low, the differentiation ratio is high, 
which means many failure cases can be differentiated by the improved protocol as ACK loss 
cases without invoking retransmission. This gives a desirable result. 
4.4.2 Analysis of Duration of Frame Exchange 
IEEE 802.11 and the DAR frame sequences are illustrated in Fig.4.12. In the current 802.11 
standard, the transmission initiator just retransmits the data frame without receiving an ACK 
(the top case). The DAR scheme intelligently deals with unacknowledged data frame by retrans-
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Figure 4.10 Performance in the improved two-way frame exchange protocol 
mitting only what are not successfully delivered (the middle case). Any data frames followed 
by ACK losses will be diagnosed, then ignored (the bottom case). Note that the more cases 
of successful data delivery followed by ACK losses, the less time needed and the greater the 
improvement would be. Let Zi represent the time savings in the bottom case, and Zg the time 
over-expenditure in the middle case. We define the Cos* o/ Di^ienence (CD) as follows: 
CZ) = Zi x — Zg x (1 — f%) 
where fi is the probability of the occurrence of the bottom case. A larger CD value indicates a 
more favorable improvement. We use goodpwf to measure the performance of both DAB, and 
the 802.11 standard. The concept of goodput of the link layer is taken from TCP and defined 
as the bandwidth delivered to the receiver through the link excluding duplicate frames. Thus, 
the goodput C; of a link Z during a time interval ( corresponds to the number of bytes B of link 
Z forwarded to the upper layer during the interval t [11]. 
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4.5 Experiments 
4.5.1 Experimental Methodologies 
We developed a simulator in C and performed several simulations to determine the perfor­
mance and efficiency of the proposed DAB, scheme. The MAC layer basically follows the IEEE 
802.11 standard [38]. The DAR protocol is implemented as a set of modifications to the frame 
exchange protocol in the MAC layer. Our experimental test bed consists of two mobile hosts, 
which are interconnected using a shared-medium wireless LAN with a raw signaling bandwidth 
of 2 Mbps. This is because we attempt to ensure that losses are due only to wireless errors, not 
congestion. This also allows us to focus on the effectiveness of the mechanisms for handling such 
losses. The simple test bed topology represents typical scenarios for wireless links and mobile 
hosts, such as cellular wireless networks. In addition, our experiments focus on MAC frame 
exchange between the mobile hosts. 
In order to measure the performance of the protocols under controlled conditions, we generate 
errors on the lossy link using a uniformly distributed bit-error model. Each run in the experiment 
consists of a 10 MByte transfer from the sender to the receiver across the wireless link. We chose 
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Figure 4.12 Frame sequences in 802.11 and DAR scheme 
Table 4.2 Frame parameters in the experiments 
Frame Size (Byte) Transfer Time (/is) 
Data 500 4292 
ACK 14 120 
RTS 20 144 
CTS 14 120 
this rather long transfer size in order to limit the impact of transient behavior. During each run, 
we measure the goodput ag normalized between 0 and 1. The other parameters in the simulation 
models, listed in the Table 4.2 and 4.3, are referenced from [76] 
4.5.2 Experiment Results 
Fig.4.13 shows the goodputs in 802.11 vs. DAR, with respect to BER. DAR achieves only 
slightly higher goodput than the 802.11 standard. This is discussed in section 4.6. To demon-
Table 4.3 Interframe space in the experiments 
Interframe space Duration (/is) 
SIFS 10 
DIFS 110 
ACK Timeout 120 
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Figure 4.13 Goodput in DAR vs. 802.11 with respect to BER 
strate the benefit of our scheme we calculated the goodput value using the ACK loss rate as 
shown in Fig.4.14. The Data frame loss rate, RTS loss rate and CTS loss rate are fixed to be 
0.1, 0.0001 and 0.0001 respectively. It can be seen in Fig.4.14 that the goodputs degrade much 
more slowly in DAR than 802.11 with increasing ACK loss rate. The reason is that DAR is 
capable of avoiding redundant retransmission due to ACK losses. 
Similar to the analysis in section 4.4, the differentiation ratio in the DAR scheme is analyzed 
as shown in Fig.4.15. With increasing BER, the differentiation ratio remains high, which means 
that a high percentage of failure cases can be differentiated as lost ACK cases and retransmission 
is not necessary to achieve high transmission efficiency. 
4.6 Further Discussions 
4.6.1 Performance Enhancement 
The experiment results in Fig.4.13 show only slightly higher goodput achieved by DAR than 
802.11. A major reason is that the goodput is influenced by many factors, such as the frequencies 
of frame losses and triggering DAR, and the value of Cosf o/ Di^lensnce (CD). 
In a higher error rate situation, more frame losses occur. But the DAR failure rate increases 
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Figure 4.14 Goodput in DAR vs. 802.11 with respect to ACK loss rate 
due to more losses of RTS and CTS frames. Thus considering the overall impacts of these 
factors, the result does not indicate a significant improvement. 
Another issue in real transmission is the length of data frames. Longer data frames may 
incur more data frame losses, and lower the probability of successful data delivery followed 
by an ACK loss. However, longer data frame increases the value of CD. Thus the combining 
influences of the above factors make the performance of DAR. scheme insignificantly different 
from IEEE 802.11. 
4.6.2 Buffer Size 
To recover from the frame loss, a data buffer is needed at the sender for the unacknowledged 
frame. It is obvious that more buffers may handle more complex cases such as consecutive ACK 
or CTS losses. However, it might be impractical to allocate a huge amount of buffer for each 
transmission due to limitations on memory resources. Moreover, the probability of the above 
event can be low. Experiments to explore the amount of buffer needed for each transmission 
therefore are necessary. 
Theoretically the number of buffers determines the number of consecutive response losses 
that can be handled, because the unacknowledged data frames can be buffered before the sender 
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Figure 4.15 Differentiation ratio in DAB. vs. 802.11 
receives either affirmative or negative confirmation from the receiver. 
Fig.4.16 shows the probability of consecutive response losses in various BER situations. The 
X axis represents the number of consecutive response losses including ACK and CTS frame 
losses. The Y axis represents the probability of these occurrences. Three lines have been drawn 
based on three different bit error rates, 0.001, 0.01 and 0.1. It can be seen that the more 
consecutive lost responses considered, the lower the probability. The lower the bit error rate, 
the more quickly the possibility degrades. Considering practical situations where the BER is 
low, it is unnecessary to cope with more than two consecutively lost responses, as proposed in 
our DAR scheme. 
4.7 Summary 
The current IEEE 802.11 standard confuses the sender when a positive ACK is lost during 
its way back. The sender will take it as an unsuccessful delivery and simply retransmit the 
data frame. An enhanced DAR scheme is introduced in this chapter, proposing a new feedback 
scheme, in which the CTS frames carry additional information concerning the previous data 
delivery without violating the 802.11 MAC layer semantics. Our method proves to be efficient 
-e—S 3—B-
-DAR 
-802.11 
38 
w m , .  ;  . . .  
1E-35 •? •'•»•! - '• . £•- - - ... : SEP.=Q-1 • >••• 
I E  1 1  ;  . . . .  .  .  " . . .  •  •  •  6  
g le w : 
g «E-1»^ *- ^ ; 
i  ' * • ,  "  " a -
1 2 : 'A • 4 ft : 9 • ! • * ' ti '0 
Nwmbar of Consecutive Réponse Loss 
Figure 4.16 Probability of consecutive response losses in various BERs 
in handling such error conditions as stated in the chapter. Experiments and analysis show that 
the DAR scheme efficiently decreases redundant retransmission by clearly differentiating ACK 
frame losses. 
39 
CHAPTER 5. QA: QUICK ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SCHEME 
An SSCOP-based Link Layer Protocol for Wireless LANs 
The IEEE 802.11 standard provides a fast recovery from frame losses using a rapid positive 
acknowledgment scheme at the link layer. However, the adoption of positive acknowledgment 
leads to inefficient frame transmission. Therefore, we propose a novel link layer protocol for 
wireless LANs adapted from an ATM-based protocol, called the Service Specific Connection 
Oriented Protocol (SSCOP). The protocol uses much less bandwidth on the return path and 
enhances the performance of data frame transmission. We evaluated and compare the perfor­
mance of the protocol with IEEE 802.11. The results show that the proposed protocol has a 
much better performance in an error-prone wireless environment, even when the bit error rate 
is severely degraded. 
5.1 Introduction 
Wireless communication technology has gained widespread importance in recent years. With 
more and more wireless devices around, the requirement of high speed and reliable transmission 
over wireless links is growing. Due to the high loss rate experienced over wireless links as well 
as the presence of hidden terminals, the IEEE 802.11 standard uses a positive acknowledgement 
scheme. 
In the IEEE 802.11 protocol [38], the reception of data frames requires the receiving host 
to respond with an acknowledgment, generally an ACK frame, if the received frame is correct. 
Missing of an expected ACK frame indicates to the source host that an error has occurred. This 
technique is known as positive acknowledgment. The main advantage of positive acknowledge­
ment is high reliability since the sender can quickly detect the occurrence of any transmission 
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error. The inefficiency problem in positive ACK has been proposed in Chapter 2. 
5.2 Related Works 
Several studies have been done to improve the throughput performance of the IEEE 802.11 
MAC protocol [24] [65] [51] [92]. A jamming-based retransmission mechanism that is compatible 
with the 802.11 standard is proposed in [24] and it could reduce the packet delay of real­
time trafEc. In [65], a reliable MAC protocol is proposed to reduce the number of control 
handshake messages. Since fewer control messages in frame exchanging, the protocol is efficient 
in transmission and power. In [51], the throughput performance of IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs 
has been evaluated in relation to overhead. Furthermore, sources of overhead are gap time, 
preamble, header fields for the PHY (physical) and the MAC (medium access control) layer, 
ACK (acknowledgement) frames, the TCP (transmission control protocol). In [92], the authors 
propose a scheme to prevent redundant retransmission in case of positive ACK frame losses. 
There are other studies conducted to improve the acknowledgement scheme in the transport 
layer [61] [44]. However, no study has been done on improving the positive acknowledgement 
scheme of IEEE 802.11. In this chapter, we propose an enhanced link layer acknowledgement 
scheme, which is heavily based on a protocol that has already been implemented in ATM net­
works, called the Service Specific Connection Oriented Protocol (SSCOP) [42]. When originally 
conceived, SSCOP was intended to provide both a reliable link layer for ATM signaling and 
a reliable transport layer for user data over ATM networks. Several new transport protocols 
have been proposed baaed on SSCOP (e.g. Satellite Transport Protocol [45]). However, no link 
layer protocol is proposed based on it. Although SSCOP targets large delay-bandwidth prod­
uct networks, it still performs quite well over wireless links with appropriate modifications. In 
addition, SSCOP relies on in-sequence data delivery in the lower protocol layers, which is also 
an important characteristic in the wireless link layer. 
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5.3 Proposed Protocol 
In this section, two simple examples are given to show the basic operations of the proposed 
protocol. Then, we describe the detailed modification and additions to make SSCOP work in 
wireless LANs. 
5.3.1 Basic Operations of the Proposed Protocol 
There are two possible scenarios in the protocol and we illustrate them in Fig.5.1 and Fig.5.2. 
Fig.5.1 shows an example of the proposed protocol. Unlike IEEE 802.11, the proposed protocol 
does not use positive ACK frame to acknowledge the reception of data frames. A receiver can 
detect a frame loss by checking the sequence number in the frame header, defined in the IEEE 
802.11 standard. If the sequence number is out-of-order, there could be one or more frame loss 
before this frame arrives because there is only one link between the transmitter and the receiver, 
and each frame is transmitted sequentially. When a receiver detects a frame loss, the receiver 
sends an C/hWiciW (USTAT) control frame to the transmitter. Similar to the idea of 
negative acknowledgement (NACK) technique in the transport layer, the proposed protocol uses 
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USTAT &ame to inform the transmitter about any frame loss. When the transmitter receives 
a USTAT frame from the receiver it retransmits the lost frame. Note that the USTAT frame is 
sent after the receiver has waited for only a SIFS (Short Inter frame Space) interval, therefore 
the receiver does not contend for the wireless medium with other hosts. 
One important difference between IEEE 802.11 and the proposed protocol is the elimination 
of ACK.Timeout. A transmitter, after sending one data frame, does not wait for the ACK from 
the receiver. Instead, the transmitter goes into the next frame exchange stage; it sends the RTS 
frame for the next data frame. Meanwhile, the receiver receives the data frame and does not 
reply with the ACK frame. Thus, ACK.Timeout becomes unnecessary in the proposed protocol. 
Fig.5.2 shows the other scenario of the proposed protocol. After a transmitter sends out a 
specified number of data frames without acknowledgement, say fi, a POLL frame is sent out 
to the receiver. When the receiver receives a POLL frame from the transmitter, the receiver 
will report the status of the last /i frames to the transmitter with a Status (STAT) frame. In 
the new protocol, a transmitter sends frames to the receiver, storing the frames for potential 
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retransmission until the receiver has acknowledged them by STAT frame. The STAT message 
is similar to the TCP Selective Acknowledgment (SACK) protocol [61], except that the STAT 
message reports the entire state of the receiver buffer (rather than the most recent three gaps as 
in SACK), and the receiver does not contain information about previously acknowledged data 
(which is permitted in TCP SACK). In the case of Fig.5.2, the receiver reports to the transmitter 
the successful reception of the last 3 frames with a STAT message. After receiving the STAT 
frame from the receiver, the transmitter flushes its buffer, removes the old frames, adjusts the 
value for sending new frames, and then continues to send subsequent frames. 
5.3.2 Timeout Mechanisms 
Two new timeout mechanisms are brought in the protocol, and 
used to avoid useless transmission from the transmitter to the receiver when the link is broken. 
Link breakage is common in wireless networks due to host mobility and interference. In this 
case, the receiver cannot receive any frame from the transmitter and the transmitter cannot 
receive any STAT/USTAT frame, either. If no timeout exists, transmitter and receiver do not 
know about the link breakage and it may cause higher layer timeout, e.g. TCP timeout. 
1. POLL.Timeout : After sending # data frames and one POLL frame, the transmitter waits 
for the STAT frame from the receiver. The transmitter retransmits the POLL frame, after 
the POOL.Timeout. 
2. Data_Timeout: The receiver waits for the data frame for a period of Data_Timeout. If it 
does not receive the data within that period, it sends out a STAT frame to the transmitter. 
These link layer timers are intended to trigger retransmission in advance of the higher layer 
timeouts. 
5.3.3 Determination of Value 
/i is an important parameter for the transmitter. It needs to be adjusted based on the STAT 
report from the receiver. A high value means a POLL frame is transmitted after a large 
number of frames. There are three effects of a high /i value: 
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1. POLL/STAT overhead is small, 
2. the buffer requirement at the transmitter is high, 
3. the response to any link break is slow 
In contrast, a small value causes a high POLL/STAT overhead, but a low buffer require­
ment at the transmitter and quick detection of link breaks. We can see that the protocol degrades 
to to IEEE 802.11 when = 1. The adjustment of this parameter is a tradeoff between the 
response time and the POLL/STAT overhead. We have devised a simple adjustment scheme 
to take both the detection time and the overhead into consideration, /i can take two values: 
STAT_Max and 1. When the successful frame transmission rate is equal to or greater than 
STAT.Threshold, /i is set to STAT_Max. When the successful frame transmission rate is lower 
than STAT .Threshold, then ^ is 1. The idea behind the adjustment scheme is that when the 
link becomes prone to errors, multiple frame losses will cause timeout at a higher layer. Thus, 
the response to the frame loss is important when frame loss rate is high. 
5.3.4 Buffer Management 
The use of selective retransmission requires the receiver to allocate a retransmission buffer 
at both the sender and the receiver. At the sender side, all the sending frames should be saved 
in the retransmission buffer until the STAT arrival. At the receiver side, when an out-of-order 
frame arrives, this and the subsequent frames will be buffered until the lost frame is received by 
the receiver. As shown in Fig.5.3, after data frames 3-7 are sent out, these frames are buffered 
at the transmitter. After receiving the STAT frame, the transmitter will empty the buffer. The 
receiver detects an out-of-order frame when receiving data frame 11, and the receiver buffers 
this frame. Upon the arrival of the frame 9 at the receiver, the receiver will release this buffer. 
5.3.5 Modified NAV Value 
Since the ACK frame is embedded in the frame exchange of IEEE 802.11, eliminating the 
ACK frame will change the calculations of NAV value. In the proposed protocol, all the NAV 
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Figure 5.3 An example of buffer management in the proposed scheme 
values do not include the transmission of ACK. For example, the NAV value in a RTS frame 
includes the transmission duration of RTS/CTS /DATA frame. Note that after one data frame 
transmission, hosts intending to send will still contend for the wireless medium with others. In 
other words, the contention for the wireless medium among all the hosts is still the same. 
5.3.6 Newly Defined MAC Frame Format 
Three new types of frame are introduced in the proposed protocol, namely, j'TAT (status) 
frame, (75TAT (unsolicited STAT) frame, and POZZ, frame. The goal of the USTAT frame is 
to quickly inform the transmitter of any frame loss, and the goal of the STAT frame is to report 
the transmission status to the transmitter. 
To minimize the modification made to the current IEEE 802.11 standard, we utilize the 
reserved type and subtype fields in frame control field to define the new frames as shown in 
the Fig.2.1. For a POLL frame, we embed the poll information into a data frame. As shown 
in tableS.1, a POLL frame is a data frame with the type=10 and the subtype=1000. Since a 
STAT frame needs to carry information about the frames in the buffer, the STAT frame could 
be varying in length. We identify a special type of data frame (i.e. type=10 and subtype=1001) 
to carry the statistical information about frame transmissions in the payload. USTAT frame is 
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Table 5.1 Adaptation of IEEE 802.11 MAC frame format 
Frame Type Subtype 
POIZ, 10 1000 
STAT 10 1001 
[/STAT 01 0010 
defined as a special type of ACK frame with type=01 and subtype=0010. Hence, all the three 
new frame structures are made compatible with IEEE 802.11. 
5.3.7 Discussion 
In the proposed protocol, the receiver notifies the transmitter of lost frame accurately, so 
the transmitter can retransmit lost frames more efficiently than in 802.11. One advantage of 
the proposed protocol is the reduction of the acknowledgement traffic. Fig.5.4 compares the 
overhead before and after the removal of ACK frame for each data frame transmissions. The 
reduction also means shorter transmission time and lower power consumption for each frame 
exchange. 
Another advantage of the proposed protocol is the elimination of frequent ACK timeouts 
from 802.11 at a high error rate. As shown in Fig.5.5, the transmitter in 802.11 has to wait for 
ACK-timeout after one data frame loss. While in the proposed protocol, the transmitter can 
retransmit immediately after receiving the USTAT. Obviously, this reduction presents shorter 
transmission time and lower power consumption for each frame exchange. 
5.4 Simulation Results 
The simulations were performed in NS-2 [48]. The positive acknowledgement mechanism of 
TF,F,R 802.11 was modified in the proposed protocol. Nodes were static (no mobility) in our 
simulations. A free space channel model was used in the simulations model. The channel data 
rate was 2Mbps. In the simulation, we consider a grid topology with TV flows and 2 x JV nodes, 
where JV ranged from 1 to 10. All the nodes were within the range of other nodes in the network. 
We compared the proposed protocol with IEEE 802.11. We were interested in comparing the 
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overhead incurred as well as the performance of both protocol in the presence of errors. Fig.5.6 
shows the varying POLL/STAT overhead at different values. The overhead is defined as the 
POLL/STAT transmission time over the total transmission time. Thus, a smaller frame length 
must have a higher POLL/STAT overhead. Note that the case where /i=l showed exactly the 
same result as IEEE 802.11. Fig.5.6 shows a high value led to low POLL/STAT overhead. 
The second simulation is to compare the throughputs in IEEE 802.11 and the proposed 
protocol with increasing number of Bows. Fig.5.7 shows the result at frame loss rate of 0. It is 
clear that the proposed protocol always performs better than IEEE 802.11. 
Fig.5.8 shows the result at /romefoaarote — 10%. With increasing of number of Sows, the 
proposed protocol gets more and more improvement over 802.11. This is because the proposed 
protocol can retransmit lost frame more efficiently than IEEE 802.11 by using STAT/USTAT 
and removing unnecessary ACK traffic. 
Fig.5.9 shows the result with frame loss rate as high as 20%. It is obvious that, compared 
with Fig.5.6, higher frame loss rate causes the throughput to drop. The difference between IEEE 
802.11 and the proposed protocol becomes larger when the number of Sows is 3 and above. We 
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find that the proposed protocol always performs better than IEEE 802.11 and it is even more 
obvious at high error rate. 
5.5 Summary 
An SSCOP-based link layer acknowledgement protocol has been designed as a replacement 
for positive acknowledgement in IEEE 802.11. Although the SSCOP was originally intended 
to provide end-to-end error recovery for user data and link protection for ATM signaling, the 
concept of SSCOP can also be applied to the link layer with appropriate modifications. By 
using both concepts of SACK and NACK, the proposed protocol solves the inefficiency problem 
of positive ACK in TREE 802.11. Because of the elimination of ACK timeout and the precise 
acknowledgement, the protocol provides much better performance than IEEE 802.11. The sim­
ulation results show that the performance improvement of the proposed protocol increases with 
increasing bit error rate. 
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CHAPTER 6. SHEPHERD: A LIGHTWEIGHT STATISTICAL 
AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL FOR ACCESS CONTROL IN 
WIRELESS LANS 
6.1 Authentication on Wired Networks 
Wireless networks have come into wide use in recent years. With more and more applications 
on wireless networks, the security over wireless networks is becoming a significant issue. The 
lack of security in the wireless environment has delayed many initiatives in wireless applications, 
such as e-commerce on wireless devices. 
Authentication is one of the basic and necessary security services required by wireless ap­
plications. In order to provide security services for applications in the wireless environment, 
two types of authentication services are necessary [32] : twer autkenticafion, which provides the 
systems proof that a user is who they claim to be, and dofo au#ienZica#on, which consists of two 
sub-services: integrity and data origin otdAenZicofiom. For data integrity, the receiver can 
be convinced that data was not changed in transit. For data origin authentication, the receiver 
is assured that data did come from the stated sender [8]. 
Authentication has several forms in the wired networks. The most common one is usemame 
and password. Additional forms of authentication are provided as tokens or digital certificates. 
In the wireless environment, however, the traditional wired authentication cannot work effec­
tively for the following reasons: 
1. Error-prone wireless medium: Unlike wired networks, where error rate is low enough to 
ignore, the wireless medium is so error-prone that error recovery mechanisms, such as 
retransmission, or forward error code, are necessary in the wireless world. Furthermore, in 
an error-prone wireless network, it is difficult to identify whether an attacker or wireless 
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medium causes frame losses. That is, the characteristics of an error-prone wireless network 
provide shelters for attackers from detections. To handle errors from wireless mediums for 
security services is a challenging issue. 
2. Mobility: Since most hosts in wireless networks are mobile nodes, the mobility issue has 
to be taken into great consideration. During a data transmission in a wireless network, 
different routes and intermediate nodes may be chosen due to mobility. This implies that a 
sender may authenticate many times to different nodes during a data transmission, which 
is impossible in traditional wired networks. 
3. Computation and communication cost: Traditional security services in wired networks 
do not consider the power issue. However, most wireless devices, such as personal digital 
assistants (PDA) and cellular phones, rely on batteries as the source of power, so the power 
consumption needs to be considered. In general, computation and communication consume 
most of the power. An ideal wireless protocol requires the least amount of computation 
and communication, so that it potentially minimises the power consumption and extends 
the life of the devices. 
6.2 Visitor Networks 
With the increasing performance and dropping price of wireless networking equipment over 
the past few years, wireless local area network (WLAN) has grown significantly. There are more 
and more locations providing access service to the Internet through WLAN, such as cafes, airport 
lounges, or campus. Generally, we can call these locations 802.11 hot spots, or a representation 
of waiter networks. Visitor networks, defined as LANs that are most often deployed in public 
space, enable the public network access on an ad hoc basis [57]. 
For ISPs deploying visitor networks, the most two important issues are authentication and 
accounting. In particular, before providing the connecting service to Internet, the ISPs need to 
validate the users, grant permission to them, and charge them according to their usage. For 
these emerging requirements, an IETF Working Group, Protocol for Carrying Authentication 
for Network Access (PANA) [41], is working on a transport protocol to support various types of 
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authentication methods, dynamic service provider selection, and roaming clients. PANA is a 
network layer messaging protocol for authenticating IP hosts for network access [36]. In essence, 
PANA does not aim to replace the link layer authentication, but can complement and coexist 
with the link layer authentication mechanism. Furthermore, PANA does not provide access 
control and per-packet authentication[70]. Thus, a link layer protocol, potentially under PANA, 
is needed to efficiently control packets to access the network, i.e. per-packet authentication and 
access control [99]. 
Traditional authentication protocols for wired networks do not work well in a wireless en­
vironment due to the unique characteristics of wireless networks, such as error-prone wireless 
transmission medium, node mobility, and power conservation constraints. 
For example, in the network layer, IPSec provides the IP security features [40], which is an 
expensive crypto-based mechanism for wireless hosts. In link layer, the current IEEE 802.Hi 
require AES cryptograph operations, introducing overhead for most power-limited wireless de­
vices [99] [71]. In an infrastructure-mode wireless local area network, the access point (AP) is 
responsible for authenticating a number of mobile nodes communicating with the AP. Current 
authentication mechanism in 802.11 standard is the Wired Equivalent Privacy(WEP) [38], whose 
Saws have been pointed out in [20]. 
In this chapter, we propose a lightweight statistical authentication protocol, called Shepherd. 
The connotation of authentication is like a Shepherd to discriminate among similar sheep ac­
cording to the limited information of their characteristics. Based on that, Shepherd determines 
the authenticity of a station as a probability value. The limited information for authentication 
results from a small amount of transmission and error-prone wireless networks. To design Shep­
herd for wireless networks, we consider some unique characteristics, e.g error-prone medium, 
node mobility, and the power conservation constraints. Shepherd provides a per-/hime oidAem-
at link layer for wireless networks. The major goal of the protocol is to determine the 
authenticity of a mobile node in an error-prone wireless environment and to provide a basis for 
access control. When the system detects an illegal node, some countermeasures against it can 
be triggered. The main challenge of designing this protocol is to effectively tell the authentica­
tion bit errors resulting from the wireless errors apart from those coming from attackers. We 
Figure 6.1 A simple scenario of the lightweight authentication protocol 
study this protocol under three synchronization schemes. Through our analysis, we show that 
this lightweight authentication protocol performs well in terms of computational and communi­
cation cost, synchronization efficiency, and protocol operation secrecy. We will show that this 
lightweight statistical authentication protocol is practical for implementation in 802.11 WLAN. 
6.3 Proposed Authentication Protocol: Shepherd 
Unlike traditional challenge-response authentication protocols, the proposed protocol deter­
mines the legitimacy of a station by continuously checking a series of packets transmitted by 
the station. As shown in Fig.6.1, in the beginning, both the sender and the receiver create a 
random bit stream called the authentication stream as well as a pointer pointing to the first bit 
of the stream. Since the sender and receiver have the same seed value and stream generator, 
the constructed authentication streams are the same. The sender sends each frame with one 
additional bit and the bit value is equal to the value of the authentication bit pointer. When 
the receiver receives a frame successfully, the receiver checks the bit value of the frame with its 
pointer value. After checking a number of bits, the receiver can use the checking results as a 
measure of the sending station being an attacker. 
We assume the sender and receiver pointers are synchronized initially and the bit error rate 
(BJ5A) in a wireless network is known. The frame loss rate due to wireless errors can be derived 
by a given bit error rate and frame length. In the three synchronization schemes, since the 
sequence number of each frame is easily modified in a wireless network, the sequence number is 
not faithful to authentication protocols, so we assume the sequence number is unknown and not 
used by Shepherd. 
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In an error-prone wireless network, frames are frequently lost due to wireless error. The 
frame losses cause sender's and receiver's pointers to be unsynchronized in the protocol, that is, 
the non-,M/TicAron*zo#OTi protkm. Thus, we develop three synchronization schemes to solve this 
problem. 
The objective of the three synchronization schemes is to synchronize sender's and receiver's 
pointers. Among three synchronization schemes, the main difference is in the synchronization 
and the sequence of pointer movements. For each scheme, we present each scheme operation 
followed by an example and its formal algorithm. 
6.3.1 Scheme 1: Sender's Pointer Jumps Pbrward (&RF,) 
Initially, the sender's pointer, and the receiver's pointer, f^., are synchronized, that is, 
= f%.. Moreover, the bit value that points to, equal to the bit value that 
points to, that is, The sender sends each frame with a bit value, 
Bityronw = After sending a frame and before receiving an acknowledgement, the 
sender keeps the same. When receiving a frame, the receiver checks .B#/rome with 
If Bit/rame = moves forward a step, that is + 1, and the receiver replies 
the sender with an frame. If ^ still moves forward a step but 
the receiver replies the sender with an frame. If the receiver does not receive a 
frame successfully due to the interference, does not move. Then, the sender may trigger a 
synchronization process according to the received acknowledgement. When the sender receives 
an frame, it means that two bit values match and the sender does not need a 
synchronization. As normal, the sender moves forward a step, that is + 1. At this 
time, J, and Jr are in synchronization again, j-%, = f^., and ready for the next frame exchange. 
In contrast, when receiving an AC#/«Wwe frame, the sender initiates a synchronization action— 
sender moves to the next opposite bit (NOB) plus one. The NOB refers to the closest bit 
with opposite value of current one. For example, consider the case of the bit stream 00001100. 
The pointer is at the first bit, the NOB is at 5 and synchronization will move the pointer to the 
opposite bit plus one (from 1 to 6). 
An example of scheme 1 is shown in the Fig.6.2. We define the non-synchronization index 
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Figure 6.2 An example of the synchronization for scheme 1 
(NSI) to be the distance between the and Jr. Initially, = Jr = 1. After three successive 
ACK frame losses, ft, = 1, fr = 4, and 7VST = S.When the fourth ACAT/o^ure frame reaches to 
the sender, moves to the WOB +1, and both and are synchronized at 5. In scheme 1, 
the synchronization is initiated at the sender side and the Sender's Pointer jumps Forward, so 
we call scheme 1 SPF. Some observations and properties discussed in [95]. However, it has a 
drawback on the sender awareness. In scheme 1, the sender is aware of the results of matching 
bit. Illegitimate senders may attack the system by using this information. To hide the result 
information from the sender, we have to shift the synchronization to the receiver side. Thus, we 
develop scheme 2 for this drawback. 
Algorithm 1: Sender's Pointer Jumps Forward (SPF) 
Aecetwer recewea a data /rwne 
if = -B#[-f^] then 
-Pf T + 
reply sender with AC#gucce<w, 
eke 
Pr + + 
_ reply sender with ACA/o^re 
lender receirea an AC# /rame 
if recewes ACKguccea, then 
| -fa + + 
else 
L  =  + 1  
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Figure 6.3 An example of the synchronization for scheme 2 
6.3.2 Scheme 2: Receiver's Pointer Jumps Forward (AfF) 
Initially, similar to scheme 1, = f). and The sender sends each frame 
with a bit value, Just after sending a frame, the sender moves forward 
a step, + 1. When receiving a frame, the receiver checks Btf/rome with If 
fr moves forward a step, that is + 1, and the receiver replies the 
sender with an ACK. If ^ the receiver initiates the synchronization— moves 
Jr to the JVO# + 1 and replies the sender with an ACK. If the receiver does not receive a 
frame successfully due to the interference, does not move. Then, the sender keeps the 
same when receiving the ACK, since it moved immediately after sending. If the sender does not 
receive ACK, does not move. 
An example of scheme 2 is given in the Fig.6.3. Initially, = 1. After three successive 
DATA frame losses, = 4, = 1, and = 3.When the fourth DATA frame reaches to the 
receiver, moves to the JVOB + 1, and both and are synchronized at 5. In scheme 2, 
the synchronization is initiated at the receiver side and the Receiver's Pointer jumps Forward, 
so we call scheme 2 RPF. Obviously, scheme 2 removes the drawback of sender awareness by 
shifting the duty of synchronization from the sender to the receiver. However, scheme 2 has an 
inherent drawback. In the above example, we observe that the out-of-sync event is caused by 
the DATA /name loss. In scheme 1, however, the out-of-sync event is caused by the AC# /rame 
Zoss. It is apparent that the DATA frame is more easily lost than the ACK frame at the same 
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BER due to the different frame length. That is, there are more out-of-sync events in scheme 
2 than in scheme 1. For this concern, we develop the scheme 3. Scheme 3 prevents the sender 
awareness and makes out-of-sync events caused by ACK frame loss. 
Algorithm 2: Receiver's Pointer Jumps Forward (RPF) 
lender sends a dota /rame 
f, + + 
.Receiuer receives a data /rame 
if Bit/rame = Bit[f^] then 
4-4-
reply sender with ACK 
else 
ft = 4-1 
reply sender with ACK 
6.3.3 Scheme 3 : Receiver's Pointer Jumps Backward (i&PD) 
Initially, JF^ = and _Bit[f%,] = Bit[Jr]. The sender sends each frame with a bit value, 
= Bit[J,]. Like scheme 1, after sending a frame and before receiving an ACK, the 
sender keep the same. When receiving a frame, the receiver checks Bitume with Bit(f%.]. If 
Bit/rame = Bit[f^], moves forward a step, that is 4-1, and the receiver rephes the 
sender with an ACK . If Bitframe ^ -Bit[Jr], the receiver initiates the synchronization— moves 
backward to the closest opposite bit plus one and rephes the sender with an ACK. Then, the 
sender moves forward a step when receiving the ACK. If the sender does not receive ACK, 
does not move. 
An example of scheme 3 is given in the Fig.6.4. Initially, = Jr = 1. After three successive 
ACK frame losses, = 1, #. = 4, and AT&T = 3.When the fourth DATA frame reaches to 
the receiver, ft- moves backward to the closest opposite bit plus one, and both and are 
synchronized at 2. In scheme 3, the synchronization is initiated at the receiver side and the 
Receiver's Pointer jumps Backward, so we call scheme 3 RPB. As we anticipate, scheme 3 
successfully makes out-of-sync event caused by ACK frame loss and avoid the sender awareness. 
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Figure 6.4 An example of the synchronization for scheme 3 
Algorithm 3: Receiver's Pointer Jumps Backward (RPB) 
.Receiver receives o do(o /rome 
if then 
Pr ~ 'r 4" 
reply sender with ACK 
else 
= JV0B&OC& + 1 
_ reply sender with ACK 
lender receives on AC#/mme 
6.3.4 Discussion 
We apply the following Eve aspects to compare the three proposed schemes. Table 6.1 
displays the comparison results. 
1. Ac* y!rst: In the frame exchange, it tells which host's pointer acts first. 
2. lender oworeness: Whether the sender knows the checking results. In scheme 1 and 3, 
the sender runs the synchronization when receiving AC#/^ure, so the sender is aware of 
the checking result. Since the checking results may be used for malicious hosts, an ideal 
scheme should keep the sender unaware of the checking results. 
3. .Reason /or non-sg/ncAmnizofion: Specifies which type of frame loss causes non-synchronization. 
In schemes 1 and 3, the reason for non-synchronization is the loss of ACK frame. In scheme 
2, data frame loss causes non-synchronization. At a fixed wireless bit error rate, the larger 
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Table 6.1 Comparison of three proposed schemes 
Scheme 1 2 3 
Name SPF RPF RPB 
Act first Receiver Sender Receiver 
Sender awareness Yes No No 
Reason for non-sync ACK Data ACK 
Jump direction Forward Forward Backward(back) 
frame has the higher frame loss rate[58]. So, the data frame loss rate is higher than the 
ACK frame loss rate at the sameBiTA (Bit Error Rate). To minimize the occurrence of 
non-synchronization, the protocol, whose non-synchronization is caused by ACK loss, is 
better than the protocol, whose non-synchronization is caused by data frame loss. 
4. Jump direction: The three schemes are classified into two categories according to jump 
directions: forward or backward. In schemes 1 and 2, the pointer jumps forward in syn­
chronization. In scheme 3, the pointer jumps backward in synchronization. 
6.4 Numerical Analysis 
To validate an analysis of the proposed theorems, we use Mathematica software [98] to 
generate the numerical analysis results. We study the impacts of different w,a, and BJGA on 
.Pr(# = ZegoZ|w, a). In the following analysis, G = 10. 
6.4.1 BER 
Fig.6.10 shows the .Pr(# = fegaf|w,a) of scheme 1 in the range of a from 0 to 10, when 
B.B.R = 10""^, 5 - 10^,and 10^ and w — 50. When a < 5, three Hat curves are very close to 1. 
The curve of largest B&R, i.e. 10"\ drops at s=5 and approaches to 0 at a — 6. Similarly, the 
other two curves drop at 7 and 8. The curve dropping at small a means the _Pr(# = ZegaZjw, a) 
is more sensitive, since the receiver requires a small number of synchronization runs to identify 
the sender as illegal. As expected, the results show higher B.&R requires larger value of a to 
make .Pr(# = /ego! | tu, a) close to 0. That is, at higher###, receiver requires more run of 
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Figure 6.5 f r(ff = ZegoZ|w, a) in scheme 1 with different a ancLBf^A 
synchronization to identify the node as illegitimate one. Thus, the impact of high B#A is to 
decrease the sensitivity of the protocol. Due to constraints of space, we only show the analysis 
results of scheme 1 and scheme 2 and 3 conform with the results. 
6.4.2 Synchronization Runs 
Fig.6.5 shows the probability of host # being legal when a is in a range from 0 to 10 and 
u; = 50. For example, when r = 2 -10"^ and a > 6, _Pr(# = ZegaZ|tr, a) is lower than 1%. When 
a < 3, the probability is almost 100%. When r = 10""* and a > 8, Pr(# = ZegoZ|w, a) is lower 
than 1%. When a < 5, the probability is almost 100%. These numerical results are reasonable, 
because more run of sync runs are required to judge the authenticity of a host at a higher frame 
loss rate. 
6.4.3 Checked Frames 
We discuss the impact of the number of checked frames, w, as follows. Apparently, checking 
more frames in authentication take longer time, but we want to see whether it is worthwhile. 
Fig.6.6 shows the Pr(# = ZegaZjtu, a) of scheme 1 in the range of to from 10 to 80 and the range 
p. i_ 
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Figure 6.6 .Pr(# = fego(|tu, a) in scheme 1 with different w and#JBA 
of 6om 10^^ to 10"^, when a = 5. f r(ff = ZegaZ|w, a) increases with increasing to, because 
a large w causes smaller ABER, when g is Gxed, which leading to higher fr(ff = ZegoZ|w, a). 
Moreover, .Pr(# = ZegaZ|w, a) increases with a increasingB^A, which means more mismatches 
can be due to wireless error. 
6.4.4 Schemes Comparison 
In all above analysis, we present only the Pr(# = ZegoZju;, a) of scheme 1. Fig.6.7 shows 
the _Pr(# — ZegoZ|u;, a) for threes schemes, when w = 15 and = 10^. The curves of 
scheme 1 and 3 are very close and drop more sharply than that of scheme 2. This means 
Pr(Jf = (ego!|tu,a) in scheme 2 does not change quickly with increasing a. Thus, it is more 
di&cult for scheme 2 to tell the node from legal nodes than scheme 1 and 3. 
6.5 Statistical Method for Authenticity of a Mobile Node 
This section discusses the process of the sender's legitimacy judgment by the receiver. All 
symbols used in the chapter are listed in Table6.2. 
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6.5.1 Assumptions 
We made two assumptions in our analysis. The first assumption is that the system is in 
synchronization whenever we apply the statistical methods. In reality, it is impossible to guar­
antee synchronization at any time of the process. For this assumption, we do a check whenever 
applying statistical methods. If there is no authentication bit error (ABE) in the last m received 
frames, we have the probability of synchronization equal to (1 — 2""). 
When the probability of synchronization is larger than or equal to a threshold, we assume 
the system is synchronized after the last received frame, and apply the statistical methods. 
When the probability is lower than a threshold, i.e. there are a large number of ABEs in w, the 
statistical method can not be used. We define the authentication bit error rate J = that is, 
the number of ABE within tu received frames, a, over «/. There is a theoretical limitation of the 
statistical method: authentication bit error rate due to the wireless errors must be lower than 
0.5. The reason is that when J is greater than 0.5, it becomes impossible to tell ABEs due to 
the wireless errors apart from those due to attackers. 
The second assumption is that no frame loss happens in the process of synchronization. In 
other words, in the case of AWT = n due to continuous n frame losses, no frame loss happens 
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Tbble 6.2 Notations 
Notation Meaning 
<5 Average Authentication Bit Error Rate (.ABEA) 
ABE Authentication Bit Error 
#37 Non-Synchronization Index, the distance between the sender 
and receiver pointers. 
Length of Data Frame 
Length of ACK Frame 
Bit error rate 
r Frame loss rate 
w Authentication window size 
s Number of ABEs in w 
% Number of ABEs, caused by frame loss segment, with 
= i in to 
h Number of segments of frame loss with i in w 
Number of ABEs, caused by the j't/i frame loss segment, 
with ^^7= i 
G Maximum length of a frame loss segment. 
before the system is synchronized, i.e. MST = 0. This assumption is to simplify the analysis of 
statistical methods. 
6.5.2 SPF Scheme 
In scheme 1, we use a statistical method to determine the authenticity of a station. The main 
objective of this statistical method is to determine whether the sending station is an attacker 
or not, according to the information at the receiver. This method is able to determine the 
authenticity of a station as a probability value. It appears that the number of synchronization 
runs is a measure of the sending station being an attacker. In scheme 1, there can be non-
synchronization in the protocol due to frame loss in the wireless medium. 
Theorem 1 For o sending mobiZe sWion assume a priori proboMify o/ stofion if 
fo 6e an aMocter is (Aaf is, fr(# = iZfegaf) = 50% and fr(# = /egoZ) = 50%, (Ae 
proboMify of this mo6i/e sWion king o Zegifimofe one Wien (Ae number o/ synckronizafions 
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is s,_Pr(J7 = fega(|w, s), is gtwn 
Fr(7f = kgofk, a) = + (6 1) 
, wAere 6 is (Ae owemge outAenticotion bit error rote ond cafcuZoted as 
G . . 
d = x BEA)' x ly-] (6.2) 
i=l 
To prove Theorem 1, we will use the following four lemmas. Consider the case where the sender 
is a legal station. The only factor that increases the synchronizations is the frame loss rate. 
Lemma 1 7f (be system is not syncAronized ond tAe AT57 «oZue is Z7, (hen one or more, up to 
[/, runs o/syncAmnizotion ore required. 
Froo/; At each synchronization run, both the sender's and the receiver's pointers advance. 
As specified in Lemma 1, the sender pointer is at least one greater than the receiver pointer, 
since the sender jumps its pointer to opposite bit plus one and the opposite bit is one or more 
bits ahead. Thus it is obvious that at least one synchronization run makes the sender jump 
(7 + 1 bits. For example, the bit stream is 111111000 and the sender is at the first bit and the 
receiver is at the seventh bit, only one synchronization run is needed to reach synchronization. 
In the worst case, the JVj)7 value decreases by only one after a synchronization run. Thus, at 
most (7 runs of synchronization are needed when JV^7 = (7. For example, as shown in Fig.6.8, 
if the bit stream is 1010011 and the JVS7 value is 3 with the sender pointer at first bit and the 
receiver pointer at the fourth bit, after one run of synchronization, the sender jumps to the third 
bit and the receiver jumps to the fifth bit. After the second synchronization, the sender jumps 
to the fifth bit and the receiver to the sixth bit. After the third synchronization, the sender and 
the receiver finally jump to the same place, the seventh bit, and are synchronized. Thus, we 
need three runs of synchronization when the jVST value is three. 0 
The following conclusion is obtained from the lemma. After one synchronization run, the mini­
mum decrease of the JV57 value is one and the maximum is (7, i.e. the new JV5"7 = 0. 
Lemma 2 Consider cAec&ing on outAenticotion bid streom. 7n tAe cose o/ no continuous ACff 
Zoss, when (he sender ond tAe receiver ore in o syncAronizotion stote, tAe sum o/ tAe fost ^rome, 
m, is eguoZ to tAe number o/ runs o/ tAe syncAronizotion o&yoritAm, s, i.e., s — m. 
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Figure 6.8 An example of Lemma 1 ( #37 = 3, s — 3) 
fmo/; If there is no continuous ACK loss and the system is synchronized at the last 
authentication bit, it is obvious that an ACK loss causes the #57 value to increase by one. To 
achieve synchronization, i.e. to make TVS'/ = 0, one synchronization run is required. Then both 
sender and receiver return to synchronization state again. Thus, the sum of lost ACK frame 
with receiving to frame is equal to the runs of the synchronization algorithm. # 
Lemma 3 Consider a series o/ continuous ACff fosses with tAe Zength n. When the sender and 
tAe receiver are in a synchronization state, the average number, E[s], o/ runs o/ the synchro­
nization algorithm /or the series o/ continuous A GAT fosses is eguaf to (n 4-1)/2, that is, 
n +1 E[s] = 
froq/; We use Mathematical Induction to prove this lemma as follows. 
1. When n — 1, it is true , that is, E[hji] = 1, because of lemma 2. 
2. Assume equation 6.3 holds for n — t, that is, 
— (& + l)/2. 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
3. When n = & + 1, we divide this (t +1) continuous frame loss segment into two parts, that 
is, the previous & continuous frame loss segments and the latest added-on frame loss. 
&j(n+l) — hjn + (6.5) 
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Figure 6.9 Two examples in Lemma 3 (left: jV\ST = 2,3 = 1; right: 
N S I  - -  2,  s  — 2)  
where is the number of ABEs caused by this added-on frame loss. 
The latest added-on frame loss may change the total number of ABEs, In lemma 
1, we have proven that at most n ABEs are required for a continuous frame loss. We 
can extend lemma 1 to that one added-on frame loss can lead to either none or one more 
ABEs. 
Either zero of one ABE caused by the added-on frame loss is determined by the pattern 
of authentication bits between sender's and receiver's pointers. Let be the bit, which 
is pointed by sender and let o%+i be the bit next to at- We observe that, when is 
equal to o&+i this latest added-on frame loss will not cause one additional ABE. On the 
other hand, when is not equal to o&+i this latest added-on frame loss will cause one 
additional ABE. 
0 , = Ok+i 
1  , a &  ^  o t + i  
For example, in the Fig.6.9, o& is the first bit and a&+i is the second bit of the bit stream. 
In the case of o& = o&+i (left figure), after one synchronization run, that is, s = 1, system 
reaches synchronization. In the case of ^ &t+i, two synchronization runs are required 
to reach synchronization. 
Since the authenticate bit is generated randomly, the probabilities of equality and inequal­
ity are 50%. We have fr(a& = at+i) = 0.5 and -Pr(a* ^ o&+i) = 0.5 . Thus, the expected 
(6.6) 
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value of 77ij(n+i) is: 
Then, we have 
-B[^(n+1)] = fr(a* = Ok+i) x 0 + (6.7) 
f r(o& f a&+i) x 1 
= 0.5 (6.8) 
= E[hjn ~r m j (n+l)]  (6 .9)  
= E[/y„] + (6.10) 
— E[/yn] + 0.5 (6.11) 
According to equation (6.4) , J5[hjt] = (& + l)/2 , we have 
(n+1)] — —^ !- q (6.12) 2 2 
(k + l) + l 
2 
Hence, in accordance with Mathematical Induction, equation (6.3) is proved. 
(6.13) 
Lemma 4 When the receiver success/uZZy receives tu data /rames, the expected value o/segments 
o/jhime Zoss with = i in to is; 
= to x r*(l — r) (6.14) 
The proof of the lemma can be found in 6.10. 
Lemma 5 Consider checking an authentication bit stream. Zet the /rame Zoss rate due to the 
toireZess errors be r. 7n case o/ continuous ylCfT Zosses, when the sender and the receiver are in 
a synchronization state, the average authentication bit error rate due to toireZess error, # , con 
be derived as /oZZouis; 
f = (615) 
i — l  
tohere G is the maximum Zength o/ a /mme Zoss segment. 
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The proof of above lemmas can be found in 6.10. 
Proof o/ Theorem J : According to Bayes' Theorem, we have 
.Pr(# = iMegoJ|w, 3) = (6.16) 
Pr {w,s\H~illegal)x Pr(H—illegal) 
Pr(w,s\B—illegal)Pr(H=illegal)-\-Pr(w7s\H—legal)Pr(H~ legal) 
First let us assume that the sender is an attacker, that is, it does not know the authentication 
stream. In this case, the probability of g ABEs in w when if is illegal 
/ 
f r(w, s > 0|# = iWegaZ) = x 2'^ (6.17) 
This is because the attacker does not know the authentication bit stream, and it does not matter 
how the attacker takes action to generate the next bit, either randomly choosing zero/one or 
moving the next opposite bit +1. So Formula (6.17) is reasonable. According to the five lemmas, 
we can calculate J from equation (6.2), and then it is easy to know the probability of the number 
of synchronization runs, 3, in w, 
M Pr(w, 3|# = iegof) = x J'(l - J)"-' (6.18) 
Combine (6.16), (6.17), and (6.18), and we can derive (1) easily. 
Since Pr(J? = tZfegof|w, a) = 1 — .Pr(# = ZegoZjto, 3), we can derive the probability of if being 
an attacker when the number of synchronizations being a is given by 
2—w 
Pr(# = iWeWK s) = + (619) 
Hence, Theorem 1 is proved. 
6.5.3 RPF Scheme 
Although the jump behaviors of scheme 1 are quite different from scheme 2, their statistical 
methods are similar. We observe that the jump behavior in scheme 2 is the case of scheme 1, 
where sender and receiver switch their roles. One main difference between analysis of scheme 
1 and 2 is the reason for non-synchronizations. As we mentioned in Section 6.3, data frame 
70 
loss causes non-synchronization in scheme 2, instead of ACK loss in scheme 1. Thus, some 
modifications are added in the analysis for scheme 2. We have the following theorem for scheme 
2. 
Theorem 2 fbr a sending mobile station if, assume that a priori probobility o/ station if 
to be on attacker is 50%, that is, _Pr(if = illegal) = 50% and Pr(if = legal) = 50%, the 
probability o/ this mobile station if being a legitimate one when the number o/ synchronizations 
is s, fr(if = legal) w, s) , is given by 
Pr(H = légales) = Î)--' <6'20) 
where f is the average authentication bit error rate and calculated as 
G 
<? - T{(4w. x BEi%)'[l - (L^ x (6.21) 
In scheme 2 and 3, when receivers detect ABE, one run of synchronization is triggered at the 
receiver side. Thus, ABE number is the same as sync and Lemma 4 cannot be applied in scheme 
2 and 3. We develop Lemma 6 for scheme 2 and 3. 
Lemma 6 Consider checking on outhenticotion bit streom. Zet the /rome loss rate due to the 
wireless errors be r. in case o/ continuous ACif loss, when the sender and the receiver ore in 
synchronization , the average authentication bit error rate due to wireless error, say J , con be 
derived as /allows; 
G . 
f  =  ^ / ( l - r ) x l Z _ ,  ( 6 . 2 2 )  
where G is the mazimum length o/ a /mme loss segment. 
The proof of the lemma is given in 6.10. Since lemma 6 holds in scheme 2, the proof of Theorem 2 
is similar to that of Theorem 1. 
6.5.4 RPB Scheme 
Although the jump direction in scheme 3 are opposite to that in scheme 2 \ their statistical 
methods are the same except for the frame loss rate. In particular, since ACK loss causes non-
synchronization in scheme 3, r represents ACK frame loss rate, instead of data frame loss rate 
^Scheme 2 is forward and scheme 3 is backward 
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in scheme 2. We observe that the lemma 3 in scheme 1 also holds both in scheme 2 and 3. 
Thus, scheme 3's statistical method is similar to scheme 2's. We have the following theorem for 
scheme 3. 
Theorem 3 For a sending mobiZe station if, assume that a priori probability o/ station if 
to be an attacker is 50%, that is, Pr(if = iZZegaZ) = 50% and fr(if = ZegoZ) = 50%, the 
probability o/ t/iis mobiZe station if being a legitimate one when tAe number o/ synchronizations 
is s, fr(if = ZegaZju;, s) , is given by 
6'(1 - J)""-' pr(H = leg,û K« ) = 2 _  +  { , ( 1 _ j ) „ - ,  
where J is the average authentication bit error rate and caZcuZated as 
G 
(6.23) 
J = X f?EA)'[l - (lACAT X gaa)]L±l} (6.24) 
«=i 
Since lemma 6 holds in scheme 3, the proof of Theorem 3 is similar to that of Theorem 1. 
6.6 Simulation Results 
To evaluate the three schemes under more realistic cases, we developed a C-based simulator 
to simulate a legitimate host's synchronization behavior of the three schemes in an error-prone 
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wireless network. We compared the performances of the three schemes at different error rates. 
A desirable synchronization scheme can often keep the system in synchronization or cause the 
least number of authentication bit errors even when the wireless error rate is high. Thus, to 
measure the effectiveness of the synchronization scheme, we use two metrics: ayncAronizaZiofi 
mfe, ,and ou(Aem#ca#on error rate, J. 
Synchronization rate, Aaync is defined as follows: in the last w frames successfully received 
by the receiver, the number of frames which are received when the system is in synchronization 
Notice that, in reality, it is impossible for the sender or receiver to know whether the current 
status is in synchronization or not. The sender or receiver only knows the results of checking 
authentication bits. If the bits are matched, the system may still be in non-synchronization. 
Thus, we can only have synchronization rate through simulation, though it is an accurate metric 
to evaluate the synchronization scheme. 
On the other hand, authentication bit error rate, d, is the information that can be observed at 
the receiver. Authentication bit error rate is defined as follows: in the last to frames successfully 
received by the receiver, the number of frames, whose authentication bit is mismatched with 
the receiver's. Since when sender's and receiver's bits are not matched, the system must be in 
non-synchronization, we have # > (1 — -R*%nc). This inequality can be used to roughly validate 
our simulation results. 
In each scenario, involving different wireless error parameters and random number generator 
seeds, the length of the bit stream is 10^ and the window size is 50. To see the impact of the 
data frame length, we use two different data frame lengths: 300 bytes and 1000 bytes^. In the 
scenario for long data frame, the data frame length is fixed to be 300 bytes. In the scenario for 
short data frame, the data frame length is fixed to 1000 bytes. 
Fig.6.11 shows the authentication bit error rate for three schemes at different wireless bit 
error rates with a specific data frame length. Both curves of scheme 2 increased more rapidly 
than scheme 1 and 3. In scheme 2, the curve of 1000 bytes data frame length went up at a 
higher slope than that of 300 bytes and reached a mainmnTn 0.5, at = 6.3 - 10""^. The 
*That is, sender's and receiver's pointers are at the same place, A = fr 
*In the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standard, the data frame length is range from 34 to 2346 bytes and ACK frame 
is 18 bytes. 
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Figure 6.11 Authentication bit error rates for three schemes at different 
BEA 
other two curves rose at a slower rate. Notice that since a reasonable range of wireless bit 
error rate is from 10^ to 10"^, we can derive that the probability of ACK frame loss rate larger 
than 0.1 in reality is lower than 10"^. To deeply investigate the three schemes and evaluate 
their performance, we did a simulation at a high ACK frame loss rate, which can make the 
non-synchronization problem worse, but does not frequently happen in a real wireless network. 
Fig.6.12 shows the authentication bit error rate for three schemes at different ACK frame 
loss rates with a specific data frame length. Scheme 2 increased rapidly, but the other curves 
went up at similar slopes and reached a maximum as ACK frame loss rate is 0.48. 
As we discussed before, the synchronization rate is a more accurate metric for evaluation. 
Fig.6.13 shows the synchronization rate for three schemes at different wireless bit error rates 
with a specific data frame length. Both curves of scheme 2 decreased more rapidly than others. 
In scheme 2, the curve of 1000 bytes data frame length went down at a higher slope than that 
of 300 bytes and reached a minimum, atBER = 6.3 -10^. The other three curves fell at a low 
rate. 
Fig.6.14 shows the synchronization rate for three schemes at different ACK frame loss rates 
with a specific data frame length. Scheme 2 presented a sharp drop and the other curves went 
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Figure 6.12 Authentication bit error rates for three schemes at different 
ACK frame loss rate 
down gradually. Scheme 1 reached a minimum as ACK frame loss rate reached 0.49. 
The simulation results indicate that scheme 1 and 3 are always able to synchronize more 
efficiently than scheme 2, and scheme 3 performs better than scheme 2 at a high ACK frame 
loss rate. The results agree well with our numerical analysis. For the data frame length, the 
results imply that a large data frame length appears to reduce the synchronization capability of 
scheme 2 because of a higher data frame loss rate. Data frame length does not impact the other 
schemes. 
6.7 Implementation Considerations 
We describe how to implement the three proposed schemes within the existing TFTBE 802.11 
protocol [38]. The extra bit needed for authentication using the new protocol is taken from 
the existing frame structure of IEEE 802.11. This means the proposed scheme does not modify 
the frame structure and is compatible with legacy devices which do not use the authentication 
scheme. As shown in Table 6.3 and Fig.2.1, two reserved types are used to represent the two 
possibilities of the authentication bit. In particular, the type 10 and subtype 1000 means the 
authentication bit is 1. The type 10 and subtype 1001 means the authentication bit is 0. 
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Figure 6.13 Synchronization rates for three schemes at different BER 
Table 6.3 Adaptation of IEEE 802.11 MAC frame format 
Frame Type Subtype 
Data(Authentication bit=0) 10 1000 
Data(Authentication bit=l) 10 1001 
-ACInsuccès s 01 0001 
AG ICfailure 01 0010 
Similarly, two reserved types in ACK frames are used to represent ACK-success and ACK-
failure, which are used in schemes 1 and 3. The type 01 and Subtype 0001 means the frame 
is an ACK-success frame. The type 01 and Subtype 0010 means the frame is an ACK-failure 
frame. 
6.8 Related Works 
SOLA protocol was an authentication protocol of the Erst use of random bit [49]. SOLA was 
designed to solve the problem of redundancy, that is, when both the WEP and IPSec are used, 
each frame sent out from the mobile stations is encrypted twice for authentication. The authors 
of [49] also presented the non-synchronization problem and proposed a synchorization scheme 
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frame loss rate 
as a solution. But a problem exists in the synchronization algorithm of the work and hence it 
is unlikely to solve the problem. Hence, we proposed a workable synchronization scheme with a 
statistical method in [95]. To simplify the analysis of the statistical method, the assumption is 
made that no continuous frame loss occurs in wireless networks, which may not be real in some 
wireless scenarios. Here we remove this assumption. 
An access control framework under PANA was developed in [99]. Data Packet Access Con­
trol (DPAC) introduces the possibility of using and negotiating a range of light-weight per-datar 
packet source authentication methods to control the data packets from mobile hosts. Based 
on the DPAC framework, authors implemented SOLA and used secure random bits to control 
the network access. In [104], authors proposed an enhanced random-bit window-based authen­
tication protocol in IP layer, called RBWA. Unlike SOLA in link layer, RBWA does not have 
a non-synchronization problem by utilizing the sequence number in each packet. Thus, it can 
achieve the synchronization even in the ACK-less IP layer. However, the sequence number is not 
faithful to authentication protocols, since the sequence number of each frame is easily modified 
in a wireless network. 
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6.9 Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed the design of a lightweight statistical authentication pro­
tocol, Shepherd. We have presented three synchronization schemes with their own statistical 
methods. The complete evaluation and analysis of the three schemes are also discussed. In 
our analysis, the third scheme, namely Receiver's Pointer Jumps Backward (RPB), is able to 
synchronize efficiently and hides most of the information from the sender. Through our analy­
sis, we show that this lightweight authentication protocol performs well at a high wireless error 
rate. Hence we can conclude that this lightweight statistical authentication protocol is easy and 
practical for implementation in wireless networks. 
Proof of lemma 4 
One important characteristic in scheme 1 is that one ABE may or may not cause one run 
of synchronization because of possible ACK-failure frame loss. Thus, given the total number of 
ABEs, a receiver cannot have the accurate number of synchronization runs at a sender, 
TVgpnc can be calculated as follows: 
Although receiver cannot have the accurate receiver can calculate the average of ACK-
failure frame loss by using the given wireless error rate. 
where r is the ACK frame loss rate. 
Then, since number of ABEs is known at a receiver, we can derive the average runs of synchro-
6.10 Proof of Lemmas 
NSync — NABE N"loss• (6.25) 
(6.26) 
nization at a sender, as: 
^\Nsync\ — E\NABE ^loss] (6.27) 
X r (6.28) 
X (1 - r) (6.29) 
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Pmo/' First, we construct an abstract bit stream at a receiver for saving the checking results 
for each successfully received data frame. Each bit in the bit stream represents a comparison 
result for one successful reception of a data frame. The bit value, denoted as 6, is determined 
as: (0 , if two bits are matched; (6.30) 1 , otherwise. 
After successfully receiving a data frame, the receiver saves the checking result in this bit stream 
and moves the pointer to next bit. Before the successful reception, some possible frame losses 
may happen, and those frame losses may cause the bit = 1. We analyze the possible frame 
losses segment before one successful reception and then extend to w receptions. Given the 
ACK frame loss rate r, the probability of the length of frame loss segment being 0 is (1 — r), 
i.e.fr(zo) = (1 — r) . Similarly, we have fr(zi) = r(l — r) and fr(za) = r^(l — r) . We can 
derive that Pr(zn) = r"(l — r) and we can calculate the sum of all probabilities as: 
OO 
y^Pr(a%) = _Pr(zo) + fr(a;i) + ... (6.31) 
i — l  
( l - r ) / ( l - r )  =  l  ( 6 . 3 2 )  
Thus, in the period of tu successful receptions, the expected value of segments of frame loss with 
— i in tu is: 
_E%] = tu x r*(l — r). 
Hence, equation (6.14) is proved. * 
Proof of lemma 5 
fmo/: Let the average number of ABEs received in the past tu frame be _E[s]. We have 
, _ -EM 
IT (6.33) 
In scheme 1, because the average runs of the synchronization algorithm in the received tu frame 
are derived as, -E[JV,ync] = E[s] x (1 — r) , we have, 
a = = _f[^L (6.34) 
tu w x (1 — r) 
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Then, we classify all frame losses into G groups, based upon the length of continuous frame 
losses, which is also equal to the JVST value. Since the total synchronization runs in tu is the 
sum of synchronization runs in each group, that is, 
G 
^Y»]/nc — ^ ^ i (6.35) 
«=1 
we have 
G 
#[JV,*nc] = (6.36) 
t=l 
Let Aji be runs of synchronization, caused by the j't/i frame loss segment, with NSI= i. We 
have 
h 
Nayna 7 - (6.37) 
3=1  
Combine (6.36) and (6.37), and we can derive 
G 
^ y ^[-%1/TiCi] (6.38) 
i=l 
G 
= (639) 
i = 1  j=l 
G 6, 
= yi (6.40) 
8=1 j=1 
Then, we will apply an equation proved in [13]. Let and y be random variables. If all JQ's 
are i.i.d., y 
T E[Xj] = E[%i] x E[y]. (6.41) 
i=l  
Apply equation (6.40) in (6.41), since all are i.i.d., therefore, we have 
G % G 
= E É - (6-42) 
«=1 ;=1 «=1 
Combine (6.42), (6.3), and (6.14), and we have 
G -, i 
^[^mc] = ^to x r'(l - r) x . (6.43) 
i=l 
Combine (6.34) and (6.43), we have 
5 =  E " t t , X r ' ( 1 - f ) X ¥  (6.44) 
tu x 1 — r 
= x 1±1). (6.45) 
t=i 
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Hence, equation (6.15) is proved. # 
proof of lemma 6 
Pnoo/; Let the average runs of the synchronization algorithm in receiving past w frame be 
E[a]. We have if = ^ 
Then, we classify all frame losses into G groups, based upon the length of continuous frame 
losses, which is also equal to the AT5T value. Since the total number of ABEs in w is the sum 
of ABEs in each group, that is, a = we have 
G 
E[s] = ^E^]. (6.46) 
i= 1 
Total ABE in each group is the sum of ABE caused by individual segment. Let /y* be number 
of ABE, caused by the j'th frame loss segment, with NSI= i. We have 
hi 
E (6.47) 
Combine (6.46) and (6.47), and we can derive 
G 
E[a] = (6.48) 
i=l 
G 
= ^2 ^ [^2 (6.49) 
i—l j — 1  
G h 
= (650) 
i — l  j — 1  
Then, we will apply an equation proved in [13] to equation (6.50). Let JQ and Y be random 
variables. If all A/s are JG[A"i] = i7[%i] x #[y] 
(3 6; G 
= z Ê = Z ^ (6-51) 
i — l  j — 1  i—l 
Combine (6.51), (6.3), and (6.14), and we have 
G . 
i7[a] = x r*(l — r) x — (6.52) 
i=l 
G 
J = ^ ] r X l - r ) x ^ — .  ( 6 . 5 3 )  
i — l  
Hence, equation (6.22) is proved. m 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we propose four approaches to achieve a secure and efficient wireless 
LAN. There are three approaches to enhance the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, and one for wire­
less security, i.e. the Freeze Counter scheme (FC) , the Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission 
(DAR), the Quick Acknowledgement (QA) scheme, and the Shepherd protocol. 
7.1 FC: Freeze Counter Scheme 
In the Chapter 3, we propose FC scheme, an adaptive error recovery mechanism. The 
FC scheme can perform different actions according to the reasons for frame losses. With the 
differentiation function, called Freeze Counter mechanism, the non-collision error frames could 
be rapidly retransmitted without the binary exponential backoff procedure in the current IEEE 
802.11 MAC. The simulation results show that the FC scheme can achieve a stable performance 
regardless of the traffic load. 
7.2 DAR: Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission 
In the Chapter 4, we propose the Dynamically Adaptive Retransmission scheme. The current 
IEEE 802.11 standard confuses the sender when a positive ACK is lost during its way back. The 
sender will take it as an unsuccessful delivery and simply retransmit the data frame. DAR 
is a new feedback scheme, in which the CTS frames carry additional information concerning 
the previous data delivery without violating the 802.11 MAC layer semantics. Our method 
proves to be efficient in handling such error conditions as stated in the paper. Experiments and 
analysis show that the DAR scheme efficiently decreases redundant retransmission by clearly 
differentiating ACK frame losses. 
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7.3 QA: Quick Acknowledgement Scheme 
In the Chapter 5, an SSCOP-based link layer acknowledgement protocol, namely QA scheme, 
has been designed as a replacement for positive acknowledgement in IEEE 802.11. Although 
the SSCOP was originally intended to provide end-to-end error recovery for user data and link 
protection for ATM signaling, the concept of SSCOP can also apply to the link layer with 
appropriate modifications. By using both concepts of SACK and NACK, the proposed protocol 
solves the inefEciency problem of positive ACK in IEEE 802.11. Because of the elimination of 
ACK timeout and the precise acknowledgement, the protocol provides much better performance 
than 802.11. The simulation results show that the performance improvement of the 
proposed protocol increases with increasing bit error rate. 
7.4 Shepherd 
In the Chapter 6, we design a lightweight statistical authentication protocol, called Shepherd. 
We present three synchronization schemes with their own statistical methods. The complete 
evaluation and analysis of the three schemes are also discussed. In our analysis, the third 
scheme, namely Receiver's Pointer Jumps Backward (RPB), is able to synchronize efficiently 
and hides most information from the sender. Through our analysis, we show the lightweight 
authentication protocol performs well at a high wireless error rate. Hence we can conclude that 
this lightweight statistical authentication protocol is easy and practical for implementation in 
wireless networks. 
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